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Abstract
The interlocking system is one of the main actors for safe railway transportation. In
most cases, the whole system is supplied by a single vendor. The recent regulations
from the European Union direct for an “open” architecture to invite new game
changers and reduce life-cycle costs.
The objective of the thesis is to propose an alternative platform that could
replace a legacy interlocking system. In the thesis, various commercial off-the-shelf
hardware and software products are studied which could be assembled to compose
an alternative interlocking platform. The platform must be open enough to adapt
to any changes in the constituent elements and abide by the proposed baselines
of new standardization initiatives, such as ERTMS, EULYNX, and RCA. In this
thesis, a comparative study is performed between these products based on hardware
capacity, architecture, communication protocols, programming tools, security, railway
certifications, life-cycle issues, etc.
Keywords railway, interlocking, PLC, OS, IDE, ERTMS, EULYNX, RCA
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1 Introduction
For the past six decades, rail transportation in terms of passenger and freight services
are in decline compared to the alternative options via road and air. In recent years,
the European Union (EU) has put more impetus on rail transport, due to rising
fuel prices and environmental concerns, by opening up the market to new players.
In the words of Antonio Tajani, the former president of the European Parliament,
the EU “will therefore spare no effort in building the rail network of the future in
cooperation with all rail sector partners” [1]. This necessitated the European Union
Agency for Railways (ERA) to address policies like the Trans-European Transport
Network (TEN-T) to use railways, amongst other transportation modes, as a tool
for a coherent socio-economic integration of the continent. TEN-T stipulates to
build the “Core Network” corridor by 2030 and targets for a shift of 30% to rail
freight from roadways for journeys over 300km [2]. In Finland, this network includes
Saimaa waterway area, Helsinki and Turku airports, Kouvola combined road and
rail transport terminal, ports of Hamina-Kotka, Helsinki, Turku, and Naantali [3].
Figure 1: The core network corridors in the EU and Finland [4], [5].
The Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system is the backbone of railway trans-
portation which ensures correct and safe operation across the network. Traditionally,
a particular ATP is supplied by a single manufacturer for a specific country or
region. As a result, long-running inter-regional trains have become equipped with
numerous ATPs, incurring huge costs. On the other hand, there are constant efforts
to integrate new technologies into the respective ATPs to facilitate Pan-European rail
carriage. European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), one of the horizontal
properties of TEN-T, aims to substitute different national ATPs with a common
interoperable system. Also, there are attempts to modularize national interlocking
systems with standardized interfaces by a consortium of European infrastructure
managers, EULYNX.
91.1 Thesis Scope and Objective
Mipro Oy is specialized in providing signalling and interlocking solutions for metro
and railway applications. These are certified with the highest levels of safety. Mipro’s
TCS-O is developed on a safety programmable logic controller (PLC) package supplied
by HIMA Paul Hildebrandt GmbH. It contains hardware (HIMax and HIMatrix) and
software (proprietary operating system and SILworX suite with IEC 61131-3 language
support) components. As of now, the TCS-O is delivering satisfactory performances.
But, since the setup is vendor-locked, Mipro commissioned this thesis to find out
a suitable alternative platform with enhanced capacity, modularity, and flexibility.
The present system possesses some bottlenecks, such as developing applications with
high-level programming, integrating with interfaces of other any other interlocking
systems which is of paramount importance in the wake of ERTMS, EULYNX, and
RCA initiatives, availing different application programming interfaces (API) via
operating systems, etc.
The objective of the thesis is to discover commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware
and software (operating system and development environment) components that
could be assembled to constitute an alternative interlocking platform. These products
should preferably be pre-certified as per the railway safety standards to reduce the
efforts from the procurer’s side in terms of time and money. The constituents of
the platform must be “open” enough to adapt to any changes, e.g. the hardware
must be compatible with most of the commercially available operating systems, to
enable the system integrator with flexibility to change as per the project requirements.
The alternative system should also comply with the proposed baselines of ERTMS,
EULYNX and RCA. In this thesis, a comparative study is performed between
these products based on hardware capacity, architecture, communication protocols,
programming tools, security, railway certifications, price, and life-cycle issues.
1.2 Research Questions
Following research questions are raised in the thesis:
1. Why the current platform might not be sufficient in the future?
2. What are the possible alternatives available to replace the current platform?
3. How the possible solutions are chosen?
The first research question is addressed in Chapter 1.1. The answer for the second
question is spanned across Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The final question is responded via
Chapters 4 and 8.
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1.3 Thesis Contribution
The contribution of the thesis is about selecting and reviewing different COTS
and safety-certified hardware and software elements that can be used for railway
interlocking applications. To this extent, the author of the thesis has chosen 2
hardware platforms, 4 real-time operating systems and 4 integrated development
environments to be examined. The author of the thesis has devised a mechanism
to compare the combinations of these products based on benchmarks, such as PLC
architecture, I/O capacity, communication protocols, software architecture and
framework, programming languages, development tools, certifications, applications,
brand value, life-cycle issues, etc. From the comparative analysis, best and worst
possible combinations are discussed. The author of the thesis has mentioned about
the factors which were not accounted while comparing.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The next chapter in the thesis is the background which provides a basic idea about
railway interlocking, safety standards in railway, and newly approved specifications
for interlocking architectures. The third chapter depicts the hardware, software, and
communication protocols used in the present system. The fourth chapter illustrates
the methodology used in this thesis for comparing different metrics of the proposed
alternative system. The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters are dedicated in describing
different alternative hardware, operating systems, and development environment
platforms reviewed in the thesis. The eighth chapter covers the comparative analyses
between the above-mentioned products and the selection of the possible composite
alternative platform/s. The final chapter draws a conclusion on the study, mentioning
future tasks that could be carried out.
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2 Background
Interlocking is defined as a manual or automatic arrangement “of signals and signal
appliances so interconnected that their movements must succeed each other in proper
sequence and for which interlocking rules are in effect” [6]. A signalling system
is formed by “one or more interlockings or signalling apparatuses (even if they do
not form an interlocking system), which protects traffic movements” [7]. In other
words, an interlocking system acts as the control system for ensuring a safe rail
traffic movement by sending commands to signals and other devices situated on
the sides of a railway track. Following the lines of technological evolution, railway
interlocking has gone through several generational changes in the past 160 years.
From the early days of manual levers and electropneumatic setups to control signals
and other devices, interlocking has progressed into an “all-electric” relay-logic based
system and later on has embraced the advantages offered by electronic controllers.
In this section, the basic norms of an interlocking system are described, followed by
the standards required to develop it.
2.1 Railway Signalling and Interlocking Principles
The Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency (FTIA/Väylä) states that an interlock-
ing system [8] must
1. be able to control and monitor signalling elements,
2. ensure safety via interdependencies between signalling elements,
3. ensure one failure does not concur uncontrolled hazardous situation, and
4. fulfill all the requirements for safety integrity level (SIL).
Figure 2: The interlocking system context diagram [9].
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The FTIA prescribes the Interlocking System Context Diagram, illustrated in
Figure 2, as a qualitative requirement [9]. In the diagram, a typical interlocking system
is accompanied by the Traffic Control System (TCS) and physical elements. The
functional objects, physical and non-abstract objects, abstract objects, and secondary
areas, such as trains and human factors are represented by blue, pink, yellow, and
green coloured boxes, respectively. It can exchange train information with adjacent
interlocking systems. The interlocking system consists of an interlocking kernel
and control module. The interlocking kernel, includes safe and non-safe functions
to perform detection and steering, locking functions, and contains information
concerning permission to move the train from one track section to another (movement
authority). The control module is formed with non-safe functions and provides
isolation between the interlocking kernel and the TCS, giving the flexibility to use
products from different manufacturers. The TCS receives commands from signallers,
remote control systems, and automatic route-setting systems and relays it to the
interlocking system, which in turn sends the statuses back. There are some dedicated
systems attached with the TCS, such as the diagnostic system which is used for logging
faults in interlocking systems and physical elements and sending the information to
external elements such as maintenance systems for treating states and faults; the
data preparation system which is an offline method to generate data for configuring
a specific interlocking system as per the national and installation rules; the block
system which controls train movements between interlocking areas and open line,
etc. The context diagram also contains physical objects which are described briefly
in the following texts.
Signal: It is the visual status of the movement authority, directing the driver
to proceed as per the requirements. There are different types of signals, such
as main, shunting, and others.
Track Section: For a railway network, the tracks are divided into sections.
The train can enter a particular track section if and only if it is “vacant”.
Track vacancy is informed to the interlocking system by track circuits and axle
counters. The former detects the presence of a train when a relay, placed in
between the rails which are electrified, is de-energized. Axle counter is generally
installed at the beginning and end of a track section. It detects train presence
by counting every axle of the train.
Balise: It is a passive device which is typically placed in between the rails for
storing data regarding geographical location, track geometry, and corresponding
speed limits. There is an interface between the interlocking system and balise,
known as the Lineside Electronic Unit (LEU). The LEU sends information
both ways via digital telegrams. Eurobalise is a special variant of balises which
conforms to the requirements of the European Rail Traffic Management System.
It exchanges information with on-board systems via a Balise Transmission
Module (BTM) situated under the body of a train. Depending on the type
of data being transmitted, there are different types of balises. In Finland,
Bombardier’s EBICAB 900 type balises are used [10].
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Automatic Train Protection (ATP): This system monitors whether the train
speed is complying with the permitted value and applies braking conditions in
case of over-speeding . Balises form the integral part of an ATP. In Finland, the
ATP is known as ATP-VR/RHK – Junankulunvalvonta (JKV) which permits
maximum speeds of 220 km/h and 120 km/h for passenger and freight trains,
respectively [11].
Point: This electromechanical system routes a train from one track to another,
as per the request sent by the interlocking system.
Radio Block Centre (RBC): It is used at the ERTMS level 2 installations and
acts as an intermediary between the interlocking system and the on-board train
system. It is presented in in Chapter 2.3.1.
ERTMS/ETCS radio: It is the communication channel of RBC to exchange
data with the on-board train system. It is explained in Chapter 2.3.1.
Juridical Recorder: This system timestamps and chronologically records all the
incoming data from the interlocking system, TCS, RBC, trackside elements,
and adjacent interlocking systems. The recorded data, such as detected and
steering values of the trackside elements, power supply voltages, failures, etc.
is used for root causes analysis in case of catastrophes [12].
User Specific Object: It includes elements, such as automatic warning system,
hotbox detectors, monitors for point-handle housings, etc.
Apart from the above-mentioned elements, the context diagram includes critical
objects, such as level crossing systems and required power supplies. The diagram
also takes into consideration the country-specific operating and signalling rules,
installation rules, and environmental factors in terms of temperature, vibration, and
electromagnetic interference. The design of a railway network must be devised in
such a way that the required figures for reliability, availability, maintainability, and
safety (RAMS) are achieved as per the standards discussed in the next section.
2.2 Safety Standards in Railways
A safety-critical system is a special system where a failure can incur injury, loss of
life or serious environmental damages [13]. Until the mid-1980s, no safety-critical
system was controlled by a software-based Programmable Electronic System (PES).
International Electrotechnical Committee’s Advisory Committee of Safety (IEC
ACOS) installed a conglomeration of subcommittees, such as Working Group 9,
Working Group 10, and IEC SC65A to focus on how to implement safety notions in
software and leverage its obvious advantages in a safety-critical system. As a result,
IEC 61508 was conceived in 1998 with a generic approach for all safety life-cycle
activities in a safety-critical system. Before that standard, there were different
nation-specific approaches to system safety. IEC 61508 presented a standardized
framework for equipment suppliers and system designers to follow a scientific approach
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in identifying and quantifying the risks associated in a system. It is the foundation
for the other industry-specific standards. The railway safety standards are prepared
by the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) in
the forms of EN 50126, EN 50128, and EN 50129. There is also a dedicated standard,
EN 50159, for the communication of safe-critical information. In the following texts,
these standards will be discussed.
2.2.1 IEC 61508: 2010
The title of the standard reads as “Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programm-
able electronic safety-related systems” [14]. The standard defines all the equipment,
machinery, apparatus or plant used for manufacturing, process, transportation,
medical or other activities as equipment under control (EUC). It is associated with
a control system which takes inputs from the process and generates outputs for
the EUC to act as planned. There are risks associated with an EUC. A risk is a
probabilistic measure of the occurrence and severity of harm/s, which is/are caused
by hazard/s leading to direct or indirect potential damages to human beings or
the environment. Risks could be tolerable or unacceptable depending on societal
values. Safety is defined as freedom from unacceptable risks. IEC 61508 is focused
on functional safety, which is one of the three types of system safety [15]. For
functional safety, preventive measures known as safety functions are implemented by
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems to
reduce the risks and establish a safe state for the EUC. There could be some risks
remaining after these measures, known as residual risks. Functional safety looks into
the E/E/PE system safety throughout its life-cycle in a systematic manner as shown
in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Overall safety life-cycle [14].
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Failures in a functional unit prevent the safety functions to be implemented.
There are different types of failures depending on the nature, origin and consequences
of them, such as random hardware failure, systematic failure, dangerous failure,
safe failure, dependent failure, soft errors, etc. IEC 61508 proposes various failure
analysis techniques, e.g. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Event Tree
Analysis (ETA), Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD), etc. Depending on the
demand for the safety function to establish a specific safe state in the EUC, there
are different modes of operation. If the frequency of demands is less than once every
year then the specific mode is called as the low demand mode, otherwise, it is a
high demand mode. The probability of an E/E/PE safety-related system to perform
the required safety functions is quantified by four discreet SIL levels as shown in
Table 1. Unlike the MISRA guidelines, in IEC 61508 the SIL is allocated not on the
basis of the effects of the failures, but the amount of risk reduction it is targeting to
achieve. For low demand mode of operation, the SIL is calculated on the basis of
the probability of dangerous failure on demand, whereas probability of a dangerous
failure per hour is used for high demand mode.
Table 1: Safety integrity levels.
SIL Low demand mode of operation High demand mode of operationProbability of failure to perform
its design function on demand
Probability of a dangerous failure
per hour
4 ≥ 10−5 to < 10−4 ≥ 10−9 to < 10−8
3 ≥ 10−4 to < 10−3 ≥ 10−8 to < 10−7
2 ≥ 10−3 to < 10−2 ≥ 10−7 to < 10−6
1 ≥ 10−2 to < 10−1 ≥ 10−6 to < 10−5
The voting mechanism is a means to add redundant channels in the system to
facilitate fault tolerance. In a MooN voting system, at least M out of N channels
should agree about an action before a control system can execute it. 2oo2 and
2oo3 are the most popular voting architectures for any safety-critical system. If a
diagnostic system is attached with the architecture then the letter “D” is added in
the naming, e.g. 2oo2D. IEC 61508 exemplifies calculations of the average frequency
and probability of dangerous failures in low and high demand modes of operations
for 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo3 and 1oo3 architectures to assign respective SIL.
The annexes of the standard are listed in Appendix C.1.
The standard is divided into seven parts as following,
Part 1: “General requirements”
Part 2: “Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems”
Part 3: “Software requirements”
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Part 4: “Definitions and abbreviations”
Part 5: “Examples of methods for the determination of safety integrity levels”
Part 6: “Guidelines on the application of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3”
Part 7: “Overview of techniques and measures”
2.2.2 EN 50126: 2017
The title of this two-part standard reads as “Railway Applications - The Specification
and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)”
[16]. The first part describes the “Generic RAMS Process” and the second part
is about the “Systems Approach to Safety”. The RAMS specifications define rail
capacity under certain circumstances, determine the maintenance costs, and establish
reliable systems. RAMS can be thought of a set of “confidence indices” of a system.
This standard specifies targets in terms of RAMS parameters and illustrates methods
to achieve them. The RAMS parameters are as follows:
Reliability: It is defined in terms of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
which is the expected time between two failures for a repairable system.
MTBF =
∑︁ (start of downtime− start of uptime)
number of failures
Availability: It is expressed in terms of MTBF and Mean Down Time (MDT),
which is the average time during which the system was not operational.
A = MTBFMTBF+MDT
Maintainability: It is defined in terms of Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) which
is the average time required to repair a component under maintenance.
Safety: It is expressed in terms of the SIL which has been mentioned in IEC
61508.
Figure 4 describes different factors influencing RAMS in the different phases
of a railway system life-cycle. This standard illustrates methods, e.g. cause/effect
diagrams to define these factors and calculate the effect on the RAMS parameters.
Like IEC 61508, EN 50126 illustrates a system life-cycle where the system goes
through different phases from the initial concept and system definitions, to decom-
missioning and disposal. The standard also specifies responsible authorities for each
phase, e.g. the risk analysis is carried out by the customer and contractor, whereas
the manufacturing and installation duties lie with the suppliers, main- and sub-
contractors. The life-cycle is also represented as a V-model. EN 50126 estimates the
investment, operating and maintenance costs of a railway system over its complete
life-cycle. The annexes of the standard are listed in Appendix C.2.
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Figure 4: Factors influencing railway RAMS [16].
2.2.3 EN 50128: 2011
The title of the standard reads as “Railway applications - Communication, signalling
and processing systems - Software for railway control and protection systems” [17].
It enlists the requirements for a safety-related software to be developed, deployed
and maintained throughout the system life-cycle. The term “software” encompasses
operating systems, high, low and special purpose application programming, firmware,
and supporting tools. Depending on the measures and techniques used in the software,
EN 50128 ratifies it between safety integrity levels 0 to 4. The system where the
software will be developed shall be defined as per, functions and interfaces; application
conditions, configuration or architecture of the system; hazards to be controlled;
safety integrity requirements; apportionment of requirements and allocation of SIL
to software and hardware; timing constraints, etc. EN 50128 recommends some
functional steps as shown in Figure 5 for developing applications of high integrity.
Initially, the software requirements are specified and then a safety policy is drawn
up in the software architecture. After allocating safety functions to different parts, the
software is designed, developed and tested as per the software quality assurance plan,
safety integrity level, and life-cycle. Then the software functionalities are verified
and deployed on to the target hardware platform. EN 50128 elaborates important
activities for the software development, such as testing, verification, validation,
assessment, quality assurance, modification, and change control.
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Figure 5: Software route map [17].
EN 50128 classifies software tools into the following classes:
Tool Class T1: It does not affect the executable code and data of the safety-
related software, e.g. a text editor or a design support tool which is not equipped
with code generation capabilities.
Tool Class T2: It is used for testing and verification purposes of the executable
code. A faulty T2 does not generate any errors for the under-testing code. The
examples are static analyzers, code coverage tools, etc.
Tool Class T3: This tool directly or indirectly affects the executable code,
e.g. a source code compiler which integrates a run time package into the code.
This is an important parameter to choose an operating system or development
environment for an alternative platform. The safety certificates must have a
clear mention of the testing of T3 tools.
The Annex A of EN 50128 guides about a range of techniques or tools to be used
for a particular application with a required SIL. It specifies that for developing a
safe software application, high-level programming languages, e.g. ADA, MODULA,
PASCAL, and graphical languages, e.g. Sequential Function Chart and State Charts
are “highly recommended”. C, C++, C# , JAVA, and diagrammatic languages e.g.
Ladder Diagram, Functional Block Diagram and Statement List are “recommended”.
EN 50128 does not recommend to use PL/M and BASIC as a programming language.
The annexes of the standard are mentioned in Appendix C.3. The lists of software
design techniques and programming languages are listed in Tables C9 and C10,
respectively.
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2.2.4 EN 50129: 2018
The title of the standard reads as “Railway applications—Communication, signalling
and processing systems—Safety related electronic systems for signalling” [18]. This
document enlists the conditions for different electronic components present in a
railway system to be accepted and approved as per required safety standards. The
standard is based as per the system life-cycle described in Part 1 of IEC 61508, and
follows various sections of EN 50126. EN 50129 introduces the concept of the safety
case. It is a set of evidences used for justifying the safety of a system under certain
circumstances. The safety case is an important deliverable from the rail system
manufacturers or IMs. It is approved by an Independent Safety Assessor (ISA) and
authorized by national or regional transportation authorities. There are different
types of safety cases as presented in the Table 2.
EN 50129 standard prescribes the requirements for a systematic quality man-
agement approach to minimize the possibility of systematic faults, and to keep the
system life cycle under control by focusing into organizational structure, inspection
and testing, documentation, records, etc. The safety management of the system is
based on the traditional V-model and controlled by an independent authority with
competent personnel to check for safety compliance from all parts of the system
regarding safety plan, hazard log, safety requirements specification, safety verification
and validation, safety justification, operation, and maintenance. The standard illus-
trates presentation of a safety evidence report, which showcases correct functional
operations with specified safety requirements against random hardware faults or
external influences. It also includes a list of constraints for the safety case and
safety qualification tests. Before a system is sent for safety acceptance and approval
procedures, a document called as Safety Assessment Report (SAR) will be prepared
based on all the evidence for quality management, safety management, and functional
and technical safety. EN 50129 also includes the measures to deal with unauthorized
accesses resulting from physical and IT-Security communications. The annexes of
the standard are listed in Appendix C.4.
Table 2: Different safety cases [19].
Safety Case Prepared By Approved By Authorized By
Generic Product Safety Case Manufacturer ISA Notified Body
(NoBo)
(Europe)
Generic Application Safety
Case
Manufacturer ISA Not relevant
Specific Application Safety
Case
Manufacturer ISA National safety
authority
Cross Acceptance Safety Case Manufacturer ISA Not relevant
"Top" Safety Case Infrastructure
Manager (IM)
ISA National safety
authority
20
2.2.5 EN 50159: 2010
The title of the standard reads as “Railway applications - Communication, signalling
and processing systems - Safety-related communication in transmission systems” [20].
Transmission systems, associated with safety-critical parts of a system, are certified
in accordance with this standard. EN 50159 classifies three types of transmission
systems depending on the type of authorization access from the designer and other
external parties. The purpose of the standard is to maintain message properties, such
as authenticity, integrity, sequence, and timeliness. The transmission system could
face hazardous events from systematic failures, broken wires, cabling errors, antenna
misalignment, performance loss, random hardware failure and ageing, human error,
maintenance error, electromagnetic interference, cross-talk, thermal noise, fading
effects, magnetic storm, fire, earthquake, lightning, etc. The reference architecture for
safety-related communication is presented in Figure 6. It illustrates that the safety-
related transmission functions are included in the respective safety-related equipment
to protect the message properties. The safety-related cryptographic techniques
further protect the message by transforming message bits, via an algorithm, into a
public or secret key called as the message authentication code. The annexes of the
standard are listed in Appendix C.5.
Figure 6: Reference architecture for safety-related communication [20].
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2.3 Upcoming Railway Standardization
In the following sections, new standardization protocols commissioned by different
governing bodies are discussed. All these initiatives have a common goal of harmonious
railway transport across Europe with better safety, higher speed, low life-cycle cost,
and an open market.
2.3.1 European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)
In 1989, the EU announced to replace all the 24 national legacy rail signalling and
interlocking systems (noted as ATP Class B system) with a single Europe-wide
standard system to facilitate interoperability, increased capacity, and safer operation
with lesser cost. This system is known as the European Rail Traffic Management
System (ERTMS). In 1995, the ERTMS User Group (EUG) was formed with different
national railway infrastructure managers. Presently the EUG members include
ADIF (Spain), Banedanmark (Denmark), DB (Germany), Jernbaneverket (Norway),
Infrabel (Belgium), Network-Rail (UK), ProRail (Netherlands), RFF (France), RFI
(Italy), SBB (Switzerland), and Trafikverket (Sweden) [21]. The ERTMS consists
of the European Train Control System (ETCS) or ATP Class A system, which
substitutes all the ATP Class B systems, and a wireless standard dedicated for railway
communications known as Global System for Mobile Communications – Railway
(GSM-R). In future, GSM-R could be migrated towards an IP based architecture.
The ERTMS system includes on-board (European Vital Computer, Driver Machine
Interface, Train Interface, Juridical Recording Unit, Balise Transmission Module, and
Odometer) and trackside (Eurobalise, LEU, radio in-fill unit, RBC, and interlocking
system) components. Some of these elements are modified from the legacy systems
to suit with the ERTMS regulations and some are newly introduced, with the most
important one is the RBC.
RBC is a safety-critical device situated between the interlocking system and the
on-board European Vital Computer (EVC). Typically an RBC consists of a 2oo3
computer for the conversion of interlocking protocols and other controlling functions
[22]. The communication protocol between the RBC and the interlocking system is
yet to be finalized. The GSM-R communication (Euroradio) between the RBC and
on-board units (OBU) is realized via RBC-OBU interfaces [23]. When a train moves
from the area of one RBC to another, the information is handed over through the
RBC-RBC safe communication interface via Euroradio [24]. Besides these, there are
internal and external communication channels and a diagnostic server.
The ERTMS can be implemented by these following levels [25]:
Level 1 (L1): This system can be layered on top of the existing legacy system.
The movement authorities are gathered from the trackside signals by Eurobalises
or Euroloop via LEUs (spot transmission) and relayed to the train-borne EVC
for calculating critical information, e.g. maximum permissible speeds and
braking curves. GSM-R can optionally be used in L1 via radio in-fill units.
Train integrity is maintained by track vacancy detection systems, e.g. track
circuits and axle counters.
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Level 2 (L2): This system obsoletes the trackside signals and introduces the
RBC. The interlocking system gathers all the trackside information from
Eurobalises (continuous transmission) and routes it to the RBC which transfers
movement authorities for the train through GSM-R. On the other hand, the
train sends the statuses back to the interlocking system via RBC. L2 maintains
train integrity with similar devices as of with L1.
Level 3 (L3): It is of the same configuration as of L2, with the absence of
fixed track circuits and axle counters. The real-time train data is calculated
by the on-board EVC via sensors and transmitted back to the RBC. This
is an important shift from the fixed block system where the train integrity
system reserves a block until the train has gone past it. In L3, the moving
block system will be realized to facilitate better train headways. The ERTMS
levels are illustrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7: ERTMS levels [26].
Each level has a system requirements specification, known as baselines. A train
equipped with ERTMS in one country should be able to run on any track equipped
with ERTMS compliant elements worldwide. An ERTMS equipped train can also run
on a track equipped with legacy systems, if a Specific Transmission Module (STM) is
used as the interface between the EVC and the non-ERTMS interlocking system. In
Finland, instead of GSM-R, a new communication mechanism, called as the Future
Radio Mobile Communication System (FRMCS) is going to be implemented. It is
based on the 5G standards, with an option of further upgradation to 6G [27].
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2.3.2 EULYNX
With each step change in railway interlocking technologies, the life-time of the
electronic systems are halving and these systems are becoming expired before other
legacy equipment. Since the whole setup is supplied primarily by a single supplier,
the replacements also come from the same source. Also, installing new technologies
in a legacy system requires a new set of interfaces to be introduced which incurs
a significant amount of time, cost, and complexity [28]. To tackle this problem
and propose standardized control and signalling interfaces, a European consortium,
EULYNX was formed by 2014. Presently there are 13 infrastructure managers in
the organization from Norway (Bane NOR SF), Luxembourg (CFL), UK (Network
Rail), Germany (DB Netz AG), Finland (Väylä), Belgium (Infrabel), Netherlands
(ProRail), Italy (RFI), France (SNCF Réseau), Switzerland (SBB), Slovenia (SŽ-I),
Sweden (Trafikverket), and Austria (ÖBB) [29]. The present design process in railway
interlocking is supported by textual information, schemes, and diagrams. EULYNX
aims to replace it with a model-based system engineering (MBSE) approach. Use
cases will be built on knowledge, user requirements and other sources, which will
be then converted into different SysML models. DB Netze and ProRail along with
the Eindhoven University of Technology and Universiteit Twente have developed
a formal language and associated tool-set to perform mathematical proofs on the
SysML models of the different elements in an interlocking architecture and check
whether these models comply with the EULYNX specifications [30].
Figure 8: EULYNX System Architecture [31].
The EULYNX system architecture, as depicted in Figure 8, contains subsystems,
such as Electronic Interlocking, Light Signal, Point, Generic IO, Train Detection
System, Level Crossing, Maintenance and Data Management, and Communication
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System. The objective of this system is to modularize the current interlocking
system with interfaces which could be interoperably used between the EULYNX
member organizations. The system serves the basic railway signalling and interlocking
principles, such as route protection, speed supervision, guaranteeing train separation,
level crossing protection, maintenance activities, etc. The architecture introduces
interfaces, for example between the Electronic Interlocking and other systems, such
as RBC (SCI-RBC), TCS (ILS2, 3, 7, SCI-CC), Level Crossing (SCI-LX), Generic
IO (SCI-IO), etc. SCI-RBC can be modelled in SysML, since it is supported by a
wide range of tools and code generators. Object-oriented languages, e.g. C++ can
preferably be used to generate code from this SysML model, because class instances
can be used to develop a generic RBC application to suit with different nation-specific
applications [32]. In the thesis, different real-time operating systems and development
environments have been discussed which allows high-level programming via suitable
APIs.
2.3.3 Reference Command and Control Systems Architecture (RCA)
There are different legacy command and control systems (CCS), which include the
trackside and on-board elements, installed in different countries around Europe. They
are built on different architectures. To implement the visions of ERTMS, various
ventures, e.g. Euro Interlocking, INESS, etc. were developed to synchronize these
different national CCS. But the EUG came to the conclusion that these projects
are of long-term return of investment types. That was the impetus to draw up the
formal methods-based reference CCS architecture (RCA) which was established on
the ERTMS and EULYNX specifications [33].
Figure 9: Interface architecture of RCA [34].
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The RCA provides an operational plan for the CCS and automatic train operation
(ATO) functions between a TMS and trackside objects. A separate initiative named
as open CCS on-board reference architecture (OCORA) describes CCS functions for
the on-board elements. RCA has gone through several baseline revisions and the
present one is RCA gamma which was released in January, 2020. The architecture is
presented in Figure 9.
The architecture displays the RCA and legacy interfaces for different safety and
non-safety critical components with coloured boxes and arrows. The interlocking sys-
tem and RBC are split into modular advanced protection system (APS) components,
such as “SL” (safety logic), “SM” (safety manager), and “OA” (object aggregation).
The SL stores the present state of the trackside elements, train positions, movement
authorities, etc. It consists of a risk evaluation mechanism to check if a TMS “PE”
(Plan Execution) request will be granted. The SM acts as the watchdog for the whole
system by identifying and mitigating hazards, and enforcing a “safe” state. The OA
is situated between the SL and the trackside elements which are aggregated as objects.
It is used for sending commands from SL to the elements and relaying back the
statuses [35]. The RCA advocates for platform independence (PI) by using an RCA
PI API as the generalized abstraction. In other safety-critical industries, e.g. avionics,
PI is established via partitioning hypervisors as per ARINC 653 specifications. In
this thesis, several real-time operating systems with resource partition functionalities
are discussed which can be used on COTS target hardware platforms. This could
facilitate the RCA PI API to be used as the abstraction layer between interfaces and
application logic for code portability and execution of CCS functions as software
applications.
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3 Present Platform
Mipro TCS-O is the heart of the signalling and interlocking system offered by Mipro
Oy which is designed as a generic application. It fulfils safety requirements of the
system by conforming to the highest safety capability SIL 4 according to the railway
certification standards EN50126, EN50128, and EN50129. Mipro TCS-O consists of
the following levels [36]:
Local user interface: It involves a human machine interface (HMI) which is
generally used for giving commands to signalling and interlocking system,
expressing element statuses, generating alarms, and recording system events to
log files.
Communication layer: This is addressed via Ethernet-based TCP/IP commu-
nication at the HMI-level and for interlocking communications.
Figure 10: Mipro interlocking and signalling system structure [37].
Mipro TCS-O interlocking layer: It consists of hardware, such as central
processing units (CPU), input and output (I/O) modules, communication
modules, power supply, uninterruptible power supply (UPS), juridical recorder,
etc. along with associated software and interfaces to the trackside elements
and auxiliary systems.
Trackside equipment layer: It consists of elements distributed in the trackside,
e.g. track sections, point controllers, signals (main, distant, and shunting),
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ATP/balises, line blocking, level crossing, etc. This layer execute actions
requested by the control system and return statuses to upper hierarchical levels.
The hardware and software elements constituting Mipro TCS-O is supplied by
HIMA Paul Hildebrandt GmbH (Brühl, Germany). The following texts are dedicated
to illustrate these elements.
3.1 Hardware
Based on the conditions and geographical layout of the application, Mipro TCS-O
can be designed as a centralized or distributed configuration. Mipro TCS-O hardware
package consists of the following [38]:
System core: It is basically a set of HIMA safety-PLCs consisting of components,
such as CPUs, local and remote I/O modules, communication cards, racks and
power supplies with internal connections and wiring.
Power supply system: It receives power from an external mains connection
and generates power in different voltage levels as required by the modules to
perform properly.
Data communication network: This layer is installed in required locations,
facilitating different system parts to communicate with each other and external
systems through interfaces.
Mounting system: It is the mechanical basis for installing the system core and
other components.
Mechanical platform for modules: It is a set of rules and constraints with
ready-made design details for allowing fluent development for new functions
and their required modules to TCS-O interlocking
Hardware design automation tool: It allows the user to easily configure the
hardware of a system based on track element layout and number of elements
used in that system.
Juridical recorder: As stated in Chapter 2.1, it is a limited-access tool to record
critical functions of interlocking which can be of use in case of different kind of
system failures.
Interfaces to external systems: It is used for connecting other interlocking
or peripheral systems with Mipro TCS-O. It complies with the supporting
communication protocols.
The system core is primarily based on HIMax and HIMatrix product families
from HIMA. The hardware products are discussed in the following texts.
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3.1.1 HIMax
HIMax is a safety-related modular control system with plug-in modules inserted in
base plates for functions, such as processing, input and output, and communication.
These base plates are connected with each other via Ethernet cables. HIMax follows
HIMA’s XMR architecture to guarantee redundancies and fault-tolerance as per
the related standards. XMR ensures that in case of a faults or during maintenance
activities, affected hardware components can be replaced online. The software fixes
for communication protocols, user programs or operating system upgrades can also
be done online. This makes the whole system “available for life”. The X in “XMR”
can take up values from 1 to 4 to suit for different needs [39]. For most of Mipro’s
applications 2MR or dual modular redundancy is used, meaning there are two CPU
modules in the configuration along with dual input and output channels to guarantee
process safety and availability. A typical rack structure is presented in Figure 11.
Figure 11: HIMax rack structure.
This system preserves safety by running tests at start-up and during operation in
all the components of different modules. During faults, the particular module enters
a safe de-energized state. Critical HIMax modules and controller power supplies are
duplicated and several time parameters, e.g. process safety time, watchdog time,
response time, etc. are monitored [40].
System Bus Module (X-SB): There are two redundant system buses which are
used for establishing safe connections between modules, other base plates, and
external networks. X-SB manages the module addresses in the System.Rack.Slot
(SRS) manner. Each X-SB consists of a 1oo2 safety-related processor system
and a system bus controller to communicate with the other system bus, via
integrated RJ-45 interfaces [41]. The proprietary operating system from HIMA
is loaded into the modules via X-SB.
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CPU Module (X-CPU): There are two types of PowerPC-based CPUs available
to be used in HIMax system, X-CPU 01 and X-CPU 31. The difference
is that the latter is equipped with an integrated system bus and thus the
available memory for user programs is lesser [42],[43]. X-CPU 01 is also enabled
with better transmission speed. The datasheets are presented in Table B1 of
Appendix B.1. The safety certification of HIMax controller is displayed in
Figure A1 of Appendix A.1.
Figure 12: X-CPU 01 block diagram [42].
As depicted in Figure 12, the processor contains two microprocessors with 1oo2
voting mechanism. The process data from both the processors are compared.
If the results are the same, then the processors are synchronized. Otherwise,
an interrupt is triggered and the module enters the ERROR STOP state. The
watchdog constantly checks for the X- CPU health conditions. The non-volatile
memory in the module contains the user programs which get transferred into the
dedicated program and data memory during booting. The memory also contains
the operating system, variables, alarms, events, etc. X-CPU communicates with
other CPU modules via Ethernet interfaces with the proprietary safeethernet
protocol which will be described in Chapter 3.2.
Communication Module (X-COM): It enables communication with other
systems via different interfaces with safeethernet and other industrial protocols.
The integrated processor uses the X-SB modules to facilitate data transfer with
X-CPU modules. It has 4 RJ-45 Ethernet interfaces with transfer standard
10BASE-T/100BASE-Tx/1000BASE-T and 2 D-sub fieldbus interfaces [44].
30
I/O Modules: There are different digital input (DI), digital output (DO) and
counter input (CI) modules with varying channel capacities are available for use
in the HIMax system. These modules are equipped with a safe 1oo2 processor
which transfers the information to the X-CPU through X-SB. In case of a fault,
the module enters a safe state meaning the input variables of a DI module are
reset back to the initial default value (0) and for a DO module, the output
channels are de-energized. For CI modules, a safe state is guaranteed by setting
the corresponding rotation speed to 0. In the thesis, analog modules from
HIMA are not taken into account. The datasheets are presented in Table B2
and B3 of Appendix B.1.
3.1.2 HIMatrix
HIMatrix products are composed systems where a single casing houses a safe processor
system, power supply module, and communication and I/O interfaces. Depending on
the project requirements, there are different types of HIMatrix modules. A typical
system HIMatrix F35 03 is illustrated in Figure 13.
Figure 13: HIMatrix F35 03 rack structure [45].
Like HIMax, HIMatrix is equipped with a processor containing two micropro-
cessors with 1oo2 voting mechanism. There are Ethernet and fieldbus interfaces to
connect with the communication protocols. In F35 03, there are 24 DIs, 8 DOs, 8
AIs and 4 CIs [45]. The datasheet of F35 03 is presented in Table B1 of Appendix
B.1. Depending on the number of points and signals in a railway project, different
HIMatrix solutions, e.g. F31, F30 and F20 can be selected. If the chosen compact
system requires more I/O then RIOs, e.g. F1, F2 and F3 can be used. The safety
certification of HIMax controller is displayed in Figure A2 of Appendix A.1.
31
3.2 Communication
Different HIMA systems (HIMax, HIMatrix, remote I/Os etc.) are connected with
each other via Ethernet interfaces, following safety protocols. HIMA can communicate
with other systems through manufacture-independent and interference-free standard
protocols via specific fieldbus submodules. Table 3 represents the list of protocols
that can be used for communication.
Table 3: HIMA supported communication protocols [46].
Protocol SIL Interfaces
safeethernet 4 Ethernet
Simple Network Time Protocol No SIL Ethernet
HIMA X-OPC Server No SIL Ethernet
Send/Receive TCP No SIL Ethernet
PROFINET IO Controller No SIL Ethernet
PROFINET IO Device No SIL Ethernet
PROFIsafe Host 3 Ethernet
PROFIsafe F-device 3 Ethernet
PROFIBUS DP Master No SIL Fieldbus
PROFIBUS DP Slave No SIL Fieldbus
Modbus Master No SIL Ethernet
Modbus Slave No SIL Ethernet
Synchronous Serial Interface No SIL Fieldbus
ComUserTask No SIL Ethernet, Fieldbus
The SIL levels are defined as per IEC 61508-2:2010, IEC 61784-3:2019 and EN
50159:2010. Apart from safeethernet, HIMA X-OPC Server and ComUserTask are
also provided by HIMA. The Open Platform Communications (OPC) server is
run on a third-party system, e.g. a personal computer with Microsoft Windows
interface to communicate with HIMA controllers. It follows specifications, such as
Data Access (versions 1.0, 2.05a and 3.0) and Alarms&Events (version 1.10) [47].
Users can develop non-safety-critical applications in C programming language and
then integrate them into a HIMA system with X-COM module of HIMax or the
Ethernet/fieldbus port of HIMatrix via the proprietary ComUserTask protocol. The
specific C program cycle time is different from the CPU cycle time and it does not
interfere with the safe applications. The concerned development environment is
based on GNU C compiler and Cygwin [48].
A safety-critical system demands that the safe and non-safe data must be trans-
mitted over a single standard network. But it was a riddle to solve in the past decades,
as the reaction time for a change in the safety-related variable is required to be lesser
than that of a non-safe one [49]. HIMA’s safeethernet protocol uses unsafe data trans-
fer channels (Ethernet) in accordance with the black channel approach and monitors
the messages on the transmitter and receiver side by using safety-related protocol
mechanism. This allows the user to rely on normal Ethernet network components,
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such as hubs, switches, routers, etc. within a safety-related network. Also, security
and real-time ability associated with standard Ethernet are achievable. This protocol
ensures deterministic behaviour in the presence of faults. The system automatically
integrates new components in the running system. All network components can be
replaced during operation. Ethernet is thus real-time capable with a possible transfer
speed of up to 1 GBit/s for safety-related data. Redundant safeethernet connection
between different controllers is established via a network based on ring topology.
Parameters, such as receive timeout, expected response time, worst-case response
time, etc. are used to check whether the network satisfies the safety conditions.
These parameters are also used for selecting various safeethernet profiles (fast &
cleanroom, fast & noisy, slow & noisy etc.) to optimize data throughput. Different
communication medium, such as Ethernet patch cables (Cat. 5e), CAN, RS-485,
PROFINET cables are used to satisfy corresponding protocols. The connections can
be established by cables with a minimum cross-section of 0.2 mm2 [46].
3.3 Software
Each HIMA controller is equipped with a proprietary operating system (OS) which
executes user programs written in the SILworX programming tool. The OS reads
the input data, processes the logic function and cyclically writes the output data.
It also performs tasks, e.g. comprehensive self-tests of the modules during start-up
and in operation, input and output testing during operation, data transmission, and
fault diagnoses. HIMA releases versions of the OS marked by the revision number
and the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) signatures. A new version can be updated
online [40]. SILworX can be used the integrated development environment (IDE) for
the proprietary OS version 7 and higher. For the prior versions, another HIMA IDE,
ELOP II Factory can be used. There are hardlock (USB dongle) and softlock licenses
available for SILworX. Hardlock licenses can be used on any personal computer but
the softlock license is bound to a specific one. Depending on the requirements, there
are license variants, e.g. full license (for any HIMA system), HIMatrix license (for
HIMatrix and remote I/Os) and maintenance license (for any HIMA system with
read-only access) [50].
The screen layout of a SILworX environment is depicted in Figure 14. It has
all the familiar setup of an automation development platform including, the menu
and symbol bars which showcase the buttons for opening, editing, deploying of a
project; the structure tree which illustrates all the elements of a specific SILworX
project, such as variables, the hardware used, library, code, license management, etc.;
the vertical action bar for editing, verifying, going online/offline, code generation,
etc., and the workspace which contains a program drawing area, object panel and
navigation panel. There is a logbook for registering important operating steps, code
generation and verification results. SILworX allows the use global variables for
storing the input and output values of a hardware resource, and exchanging data in
a particular user program and with the external systems. Local variables are used
only inside a particular program organisation unit (POU).
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Figure 14: Screen layout of SILworX [50].
Programming languages listed in IEC 61131-3 can be used for developing user
applications in SILworX. The IDE also allows usage of C++ function blocks with the
generic SILworX functional blocks. The licenses for creating and modifying the C++
programs comes as a separate package. The input and output variables of the C++
function blocks can serve as an interface to the functions of the C++ source code from
other third-party tools. But the C++ source code cannot be tested online or simulated
offline and it can be used for safety-related applications only after consultation with
the testing authority responsible for the final inspection [51]. The safety certifications
of SILworX are displayed in Figure A3 and A4 of Appendix A.1.
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4 Thesis Methodology
This chapter presents the hardware, OS, and IDEs investigated in the thesis to build
an alternative platform. These products are chosen based on the following conditions
that the solutions must be
1. of COTS type and pre-certified to the highest levels of safety concerning the
generic industrial standard (IEC 61508) and rail specific standards (EN 5012x)
to save time and money, and
2. open in a sense that if in future, for example, a new OS is needed to be installed
then the hardware and IDE must be compatible with that change.
For the thesis, the following products are explored: Hardware: ControlSafe
Platform (SMART Embedded Computing) and MH50C (MEN Mikro Elektronik
GmbH). OS: VxWorks 7 (Wind River Systems), QNX OS for Safety (BlackBerry
Limited), INTEGRITY (Green Hills Software), and PikeOS (SYSGO GmbH). IDE:
SCADE (Ansys, Inc.), FlexiSafe (infoteam Software AG), Prover Trident (Prover
Technology AB), and CODESYS Safety (3S-Smart Software Solutions GmbH). These
products can give 32 possible combinations for an alternative platform as shown in
Figure 15.
Figure 15: Possible combinations of hardware, OS, and IDEs.
A particular combination is quantified with a performance index or cost symbolized
as, Ci(Hj, Ok, El), where i = 1...32, j = 1, 2, k = 1...4, l = 1...4, which is constituted
of the following costs:
1. standalone hardware cost: C(Hj),
2. standalone OS cost: C(Ok),
3. standalone IDE cost: C(El),
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4. compatibility costs: C(Hj, Ok) and C(Ok, El).
The first three costs signify the individual merits of the hardware, OS, and IDE
platforms. The compatibility cost indicates the affinity of a hardware platform and
an IDE with a specific OS. The whole platform is assumed to be a linear system,
thus the superposition principle has been adopted to calculate the final cost which is
the summation of all the other costs:
Ci(Hj, Ok, El) = C(Hj) + C(Ok) + C(El) + C(Hj, Ok) + C(Ok, El)
These constituent costs are based on the certain parameters, e.g. C(Hj) depends
on the hardware architecture, I/O capacity, certifications, operating temperature, etc.;
C(Ok) depends on kernel architecture, scheduling policies, support for target archi-
tectures, etc.; C(El) depends on the framework, supporting languages, development
tools, etc. Chapter 8 discusses these parameters in detail.
Not all the parameters hold equal significance while choosing for a particular
product, e.g. availability of all the required certifications for a hardware platform is
more important than the range of the operating temperatures. Because the money
and effort spent to certify a component are higher than installing additional heating
or cooling arrangements. The critical factors are allocated with a weightage of 1
and the others are with 0.5. Based on the datasheets presented in Appendix B,
every parameter of each product is assigned with a score in the scale of 1 to 5.
The respective costs are calculated by multiplying the weightage with the score as
presented in Chapter 8.
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5 Alternative Hardware Platforms
Railway interlocking employs a hardware platform or a PLC which is “safer” than the
standard PLCs. A safe PLC for any safety-critical system adheres to the regulations
set by IEC 61508. A safe PLC for railways further follows the industry-specific
standards EN 50126, EN 50128, and EN 50129 which are described in Chapter 2.2.
In Europe, there are several product certification services offered by organisations,
such as TÜV Rheinland, TÜV Nord, TÜV SÜD, Exida, etc. A safe PLC differs
from a standard one in terms of architecture, inputs, and outputs [52]. From the
architectural point of view, the safe PLC is equipped with two microprocessors to
guarantee redundancy. RAM and flash memories, used for storing and executing of
control programs, are protected and monitored by special-purpose circuits. For a safe
PLC, the functionalities of the input channels are further secured by an additional
internal ‘output’ circuit. A standard PLC’s output channel is equipped with a
switching device. But for a safe PLC, there are two such devices, which are controlled
by unique microprocessors. This preserves system integrity by driving an output
channel to a known “safe” state in case there is a failure in the microprocessors or
devices. Because of these redundancy and self-testing features, a safe PLC generally
costs 25% to 30% more than that of a standard PLC. In the following sections, the
hardware selections described in Chapter 4 will be briefly introduced.
5.1 ControlSafe Platform (CSP)
It was originally developed by Artesyn Embedded Computing (Tempe, Arizona, USA)
which was a spinoff from the Emerson EC group (Motorola, Force Computers and
Astec). Artesyn was acquired by SMART Global Holdings in July 2019, changing
the name to SMART Embedded Computing (SMART EC) [53]. The rack structure
is of the CSP is presented in Figure 16.
Figure 16: Front-view of the ControlSafe Platform [54].
Each rack consists of two CPUs (Master and Checker), a switch module with
10/100/1000 BASE-T Ethernet ports to interface with other modules, and six I/O
modules along with an AC power supply unit. Each rack is called as ControlSafe
Computer (CSC). The Safety Relay Box (SRB) is used for evaluating which CSC
37
is operating and which one is in standby mode. The CSP has identical processor
architecture, as each CPU module has one NXP QorIQ P2 processor while the I/O
module has one NXP QorIQ P1 processor.
In railway systems, most of the processors use hard lockstep synchronization
technique where firstly the clocks of both the redundant processors are synchronized,
then the processors execute the same instructions at the same time and finally the
data and address bits from both execution results are compared. If they are same
then these results will drive the specific external equipment, else the system will
fail safely. The requirement for the processors to execute the same instructions at
the same time requires the processors to be deterministic. This condition is hard to
achieve as modern multi-threaded processors are not strictly deterministic due to
various reasons, e.g., soft errors, modern power management methods, cache misses,
etc. Secondly, due to the non-deterministic jitters produced by clock multipliers and
multi-channel memory architecture, it is practically impossible to synchronize the
data buses of two different CPUs.
Figure 17: Hard and data lockstep architectures [55].
SMART EC has come up with a solution called as data lockstep architecture [55].
Whereas the hard lockstep sets the deterministic boundary at the processor itself,
for data lockstep it is at the output stage of the processor board and to the system
data fabric. As shown in Figure 17, the data and address bits are compared before
arriving at the data bus. This also allows to upgrade the processor architecture over
time while retaining the same I/Os.
CSP employs a 2oo2 voting scheme with the Master and Checker CPUs, and
dual redundancy with two CSCs. At one time, one of the CSCs can be operational.
The user application running on the “active” CSC has full control over the I/O ports.
The same application running on the “standby” CSC monitors safety-relevant input
ports and all interference-free ports, but by default cannot drive any safety-relevant
output. To designate the active/standby statuses for the CSCs, a hardware-based
mechanism called the Safety Relay Box (SRB) is used. The SRB contains two safety
relay-based field-replaceable units (FRU), each of which is connected to one CSC.
After the SRB’s power is turned on, it selects the first CSC for which both the CPUs
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are healthy to be the active CSC. The other CSC enters the standby mode. Upon
detecting a failure, the active CSC signals its state to the SRB, which in turn hands
over the authority to drive the safety-relevant outputs to the standby CSC, provided
it is healthy. SMART EC also gives a provision to use a patented software measure,
Direct Connect Algorithm (DCA), which can be used instead of SRB to reduce
hardware hassles. The datasheet of the CSP is presented in Table B4 of Appendix
B.2.
Different types I/O modules can be integrated into the CSP, e.g. the general-
purpose I/O module, built on ARM Cortex with Altera FPGA SoC, with 16 channels
for DI, DO and CI [56]; CAN module, built on NXP QorIQ P1 processor, with 4 ports
to connect with trackside devices or external systems [57]; and UART module, built on
ARM Cortex with Altera FPGA SoC, with 6 serial interfaces for RS485/RS422/RS232
[58]. Additional Ethernet modules, equipped with 2 ports of 10/100/1000 BASE-T
capabilities, can be inserted in the I/O slots to increase connectivity [59]. Apart
from the CSP, SMART EC offers different other platforms, which are based on the
same architecture but with varying footprints, e.g., Expansion Box Platform, with 11
I/O modules, for larger interlocking applications [60], and Carborne Platform, with
a DC-powered compact chassis and 12 I/O modules [61], for on-board applications,
e.g. ATP, ATO etc.
SMART EC has described CSP as a system where the ControlSafe Software,
based on Wind River’s VxWorks 653 operating system, works on top of the respective
CSCs. This whole package is certified as per EN 50126: 1999 (SIL4), EN 50129: 2003
(SIL4), EN 50128: 2011 (SIL4), IEC 61508-1(ed.2) (SIL3), IEC 61508-2(ed.2) (SIL3)
and IEC 61508-3(ed.2) (SIL3). The safety certification is displayed in Figure A5 in
Appendix A.2. The certification parameters include safe application programming,
voting and 2oo2 active/standby arbitration, and safety-related communication [62].
The other platforms are also certified to the highest safety standards [153], [154].
The SMART EC package for a certain project includes, the required platform/s,
runtime license, board support packages (BSP) for VxWorks, and API libraries. The
certification evidence package contains safety cases, safety manuals, SAR, and SIL4
safety certificates from TÜV SÜD. SMART EC promises 15 years of planned product
life and 25 years of extended support and services. The hardware is designed to deliver
platform hardware availability of six nines (99.9999%) [54]. SMART EC has strong
strategic partnerships with key silicon and software vendors, such as NXP/Freescale
and Wind River for obsolescence and inventory management. Besides these, SMART
EC provides technical support regarding application porting, development consulting,
engineering, installation, repair, root cause analysis, revision management, migration
from legacy system to a new product generation, etc. [63].
CSP has been used in collaboration with China Railway Signal & Communication
(CRSC Wanquan, China) for a 10 station interlocking application for a power plant
coal transportation system in Pakistan, and a tram point controller application, with
custom I/O modules, for Hainan Sanya Rail Transit Project in China [64]. The
Expansion Box Platform was used for a 65.7 km long track covering six stations in
South Korea for Hyukshin Engineering Company Limited (South Korea) [65]. All
the applications have successfully met the SIL4 criteria.
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5.2 MH50C
MH50C or menTCS platform is developed by MEN Mikro Elektronik GmbH (Nürn-
berg, Germany) which was merged with the Swiss communication company duagon
Holding AG in April, 2019 [66]. The rack structure is presented in Figure 18.
Figure 18: Front-view of MH50C [67].
It is a 40 HP CompactPCI system configured with a safe CPU, a real-time
Ethernet card, I/O slots, and a power supply unit. Figure 19 depicts the typical
rack structure of MEN MH50C Platform [67]. There are three Intel Atom-based
processors in the single CPU module (F75P), as illustrated in Figure 19. Out of these
three, 2 are control processors (CP) and the other one is I/O processor (IOP) [68].
The CPs facilitate flexible implementation options for functional safety requirements
and provide support for advanced, certified operating systems up to SIL4 by asserting
a "safe domain”. These are configured for deterministic behaviour with techniques
e.g., hyper-threading speed-step and basic input/output system (BIOS) interrupts
being disabled.
The IOP lies outside of the safe domain, looks after the common I/O and memory
facilities, and provides a user-friendly software interface. The Inter-Communication
FPGA (ICOM) provides communication between all three processors via on-board
Ethernet of 100BASE-T capabilities or shared RAM. F75P enters a specific “fail-
silent” safe state after each failure and restarts automatically. There is an independent
supervisor which acts as a timeout watchdog to check for over-voltage, under-voltage,
excess temperature, and internal errors of the CPs and ICOM. The function is
implemented in the IOP by a dedicated Board Management Controller (BMC).
The records of these malfunctions are stored in a non-volatile FRAM. There is
also a real-time clock with super-capacitor backup connected with the IOP. Each
processor has been allotted with caches, flash memory and RAM. In addition, the
IOP can be attached with mass storage devices for boot image and file system. For
synchronization, a software-based proprietary function (SyncLayer) is used to ensure
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Figure 19: F75P architecture [68].
both CPs use the same input data and verify matching of the calculated output data.
For safe communication between the F75P and the I/O modules, a black channel
approach along with EN 50159 certified FailSafe over EtherCAT (FSoE) is used,
which begins at the boundaries of the safe domain on the F75P board. EtherCAT is
a real-time Industrial Ethernet technology introduced by Beckhoff Automation in
2003. In this communication mechanism, the master sends a telegram that passes
through each slave in the network. The nodes read the data “on the fly” and insert
their own data in the frame. FSoE uses frames called as safety containers, which
contain safety-critical process data and security measures. The containers along with
non-safety critical data are transferred over the untrusted black channel [69]. For
F75P, the IOP takes safe containers from both the CPs which include process and
communication data (header, CRC etc.), and generates EtherCAT messages. Any
error caused by the IOP is detected by the safety communication layer. EtherCAT
is a deterministic protocol which operates without any network switches, with cycle
times less than 5 ms. EtherCAT supports a ring topology which provides a continuity
in service in case of a broken cable or the loss of power on a particular remote I/O
panel [70]. MEN Mikro’s proprietary Process Data Application Framework (PACY)
is integrated with FSoE protocol. PACY acts as an abstraction layer to handle the
communication between CPU, I/O modules and user programs. It is a C library
which provides an API for application developers to control and monitor different
kinds of I/O through C programming language variables. Every I/O channel is
represented by a specific independent PACY channel [71].
MEN Mikro offers a DI module with 16 channels [72] and DO modules with 8
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channels, with different output types, such as load to ground (high-side switching)
[73] and load to supply voltage (low-side switching) [74]. To achieve the highest
levels of safety integrity (SIL 4), two channels of a module is used for a single I/O.
These modules satisfy safety functionalities through measures, such as local over-
voltage or under-voltage and over-temperature monitoring, external supply voltage
supervision, self-test mechanisms in every 10 ms via PACY, clock monitoring, and
safe communication through FSoE. In case of fatal errors, the module drives the
respective channel/s to safe state within 10 ms. There are remote I/O modules with 4
and 8 slots available to be connected with MH50C via FSoE to integrate applications,
such as train communication network with different regional TCS configurations [75].
MEN Mikro has certified the safety-related programmable system F75P-3U Safe
Computer via TÜV SÜD as per EN 50126: 1999 (SIL4), EN 50129: 2003 (SIL4),
IEC 61508-1(ed.2) (SIL1-3), IEC 61508-2(ed.2) (SIL1-3). Apart from that, MEN
Mikro has collaborated with Blackberry to develop a BSP for F75P which is based
on QNX OS for Safety. This bundle also got certified according to EN 50128: 2011
(SIL4), IEC 61508-3(ed.2) (SIL3). The synchronization mechanism SyncLayer and
the safe API for QNX, named as Y-COM, are certified as per EN 50128: 2011 (SIL4)
and IEC 61508-3: 2010 (SIL3) [76], [77]. MEN Mikro offers two different packages.
In the first one, only the F75P is offered along with safety case, safety user guide,
certificates, and assessment report. And the other is a bundled package including
QNX BSP along with the previously mentioned contents. MEN Mikro provides
40 hours of support with the F75P standalone package and 90 hours of extensive
support for the bundled package. The company also promises to deliver identical
boards per project for 10 years along with 25 years of technical support per project
[71], [78]. The datasheet of MH50C is presented in Table B5 of Appendix B.3.
MEN Mikro has extensive partnerships with a range of companies in the embed-
ded and railway industries, such as NXP Semiconductors N.V., Wind River Systems,
Green Hills Software, SYSGO GmbH, Intel Corporation, BlackBerry Limited, in-
foteam Software AG, etc. [79]. The MH50C has been used in various wayside and
rolling stock applications including, interlocking, level crossings, ATO, ATP, CBTC,
etc., but none of these are published in the public domain.
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6 Alternative Operating System Platforms
A general purpose OS is a program that acts as an intermediary between the user
and the computer hardware. It performs three main functions, such as managing
the computer’s resources, e.g. CPU, disk drives, and printers etc.; establishing a
user interface; and executing and providing services for the application software [80].
Depending on the schedulers that decide which program to execute by rationing
system resources, there are different types of OS, e.g. UNIX distributes each user
a sufficient processing time but Windows ensures that the user request is served
as soon as possible. For a safety-critical system, the importance of performing
certain activities are of paramount importance. This might require pausing the
general applications and commencing a higher priority task. This calls for a special
purpose, real-time operating system (RTOS) which serves real-time applications to
meet critical deadlines by switching between tasks based on their priorities (event-
driven) or clock interrupts (time-sharing). Most of the RTOS adopt the microkernel
architecture where the vital services, e.g. inter process-communication, memory
management, and CPU scheduling are kept inside the kernel space and other services,
e.g. user application, file system, networking drivers, etc. are placed in different
address spaces. The limited “micro” size of the kernel increases the execution speed
of critical services, protects it from getting corrupted, and enables other services
to get installed easily. For an RTOS, the preemptive priority scheduling is one of
the most popular scheduling algorithms. It assigns each task with a priority. If a
higher priority task lines up in the queue, the ongoing task can be pre-empted. Some
RTOS follow round-robin scheduling where tasks are given a quantum of CPU time.
Each task is meant to run only in their respective quantum and will be halted after
that, regardless of its progress. In the following texts, the thesis will briefly cover
the COTS RTOS platforms mentioned in Chapter 4.
6.1 VxWorks 7
It is released and maintained by Wind River Systems (California, USA), which
was acquired by Texas Pacific Group from Intel on 2018. The legacy VxWorks
OS is one of the most deployed RTOS with applications ranging from industrial
sectors to NASA missions [81]. The kernel of VxWorks 7, an RTOS for safety-
critical railway and automotive applications, is based on VxWorks 653 which was
designed to serve aeronautic purposes. It is of a microkernel architecture which
permits preemptive priority-based and round-robin scheduling with message passing
type of inter-process communication (IPC). VxWorks 7 allows up to 255 partitions
to integrate applications of different safety-criticality in one platform with easy
portability of other VxWorks applications. It is also supported with Wind River’s
IEC 61508 (SIL 3) Helix Virtualization Platform. VxWorks 7 provides BSPs with
multi-processing support for over 80 boards from different architectures, such as Arm,
PowerPC, Intel, RISC-V, etc. It allows the end-users to choose from different APIs
to avail open standards for writing applications in Ada, Java, C and C++ [82]. This
RTOS is certified with SIL 3 as per the first, third and fourth part of IEC 61508:
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2010 [83]. The safety certification is displayed in Figure A6 in Appendix A.3. Wind
River chooses to opt for railway certifications only with specific hardware platforms,
e.g. with CSP from SMART EC, as illustrated in Chapter 5.1.
Figure 20: Wind River VxWorks 653 Platform [84].
VxWorks 7 is packed with a proprietary development environment, Workbench,
which is based on Eclipse framework. In this IDE, applications can be developed
with high-level programming languages, e.g. C or C++ [85]. The proprietary DIAB
compiler toolchain fulfils the requirements for T3 tools as per IEC 61508-3 [86].
The safety certification is displayed in Figure A7 in Appendix A.3. There are
options to use other compilers, e.g. LLVM for Arm and Intel architectures, and
GCC for PowerPC architecture. The IDE uses its own debugger for codes running
simultaneously on multiple cores, tasks, physical processors, and other target OS.
It is based on on-chip-debugging for easier integration of new hardware designs.
Workbench can be hosted on Windows, Ubuntu, Red Hat, and others. It contains
analysis tools, such as System Viewer for providing a graphical representation about
how tasks, threads, interrupts, etc. are getting executed on the target; Performance
Profiler which reports on how much CPU cycles are being consumed in a program
by individual routines; Memory Analyzer for tracking memory usage and detecting
memory leaks via system calls or third-party libraries; Data Monitor for checking
variables and data structures; and Code Coverage Analyzer which looks into which
code segments are executed during testing and removes unused codes. The datasheet
of the RTOS and IDE is presented in Table B6 of Appendix B.4.
VxWorks 7 and its toolchain have been used for a CBTC development project
of Beijing Traffic Control Technology Co., Ltd (China). The application was about
developing an automatic control system that can handle traffic headway of 90 seconds
in the Yizhuang and Changping lines of the Beijing subway network [87]. VxWorks
7 has been installed in the world’s first Wi-Fi and LTE based SIL 4 certified CBTC
system, Korean Radio-based Train Control System (South Korea). A custom BSP
was made in collaboration with the customer LS Electric (South Korea) and other
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services were provided [88].
6.2 QNX OS for Safety (QOS)
QNX is one of the prominent suppliers of RTOS for the last four decades. Their
legacy line of products are used in automotive, medical, robotic, defence, industrial,
and transportation applications. In 2010, QNX Software Systems was acquired by
BlackBerry/RIM (Canada) [89]. The railway specific RTOS is named as QNX OS for
Safety (QOS). It is a safety-certified version of the popular microkernel-based QNX
Neutrino RTOS architecture, which supports spatial and temporal domain separation
at the application level. QOS allows tasks of mixed criticalities to be used in the
same platform without any interferences [90]. Along with the message passing type
of IPC, QOS allows for preemptive priority-based scheduling with the option to use
other methods, distributed priority inheritance, and adaptive partitioning. There are
BSPs available to comply with boards from AMD, Intel, NVIDIA, NXP, Qualcomm,
Renesas, Samsung, TI, Xilinx SoCs, etc. QOS supports a broad range of POSIX APIs.
Security is guaranteed by mechanisms, such as secure boot, integrity measurement,
sandboxing, access control (mandatory or discretionary), and rootless execution [91].
QOS is certified to SIL 3 as per IEC 61508 [92]. The railway certifications are done
only with specific hardware platforms, e.g. MH50C from MEN, as illustrated in
Chapter 5.2. Blackberry offers the IEC 61508 (SIL 3) certified QNX Hypervisor for
Safety upon which a guest OS, e.g. QOS can be run. This environment allows the
guest OS to pin virtual CPUs on cores from different hardware manufacturers [93].
The safety certification is displayed in Figure A9 in Appendix A.4.
Figure 21: QNX Neutrino RTOS architecture [91].
QOS has an integrated IDE, QNX Momentics Tool Suite which is based on Eclipse
framework and supports C, C++, Python, Perl, etc. The toolchain is equipped with
the generic GCC compiler and GDB debugger. The analysis tools include, System
Profiler to monitor OS events, e.g. kernel calls, interrupts, etc.; Code Coverage to
enable a user to decide which parts of the program to run, and which parts need
further testing; specific tools to check for race conditions, memory leaks, security
issues etc. during testing phases; Valgrind for runtime error detection etc. The IDE
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has a special advantage due to the ability its host macOS, apart from Windows and
Linux [94]. It fulfills the requirements for T3 tools as per IEC 61508-3 [92]. The
combined safety certification of QOS and Momentics is displayed in Figure A8 in
Appendix A.4. The rail specific applications of QOS are not available in the public
domain. QOS datasheet is presented in Table B7 of Appendix B.5.
6.3 INTEGRITY
INTEGRITY is an RTOS developed by Green Hills Software LLC (California, USA).
It is the leading supplier of RTOS in the American defence sector for the last 40 years
[95]. The RTOS is based on a separation supported microkernel with a real-time
scheduler allowing multiple priority levels. INTEGRITY uses message passing type
of IPC. The partitions are well secured from unauthorized accesses which can lead
to denial-of-service attacks. The kernel never blocks interrupts, so that highest
priority interrupts can be processed with minimum latency. Messages, semaphores
and other kernel objects created during process requests are kept in process memory,
instead of kernel memory. INTEGRITY has subsided the kernel with a memory
stack, to prevent the overflow of the user stack. It supports multiprocessing with a
range of target hardware from Altera, ARM, AMD, Fujitsu, IBM, PowerPC, NXP,
Renesas, TI, Xilinx etc. There is a hypervisor platform, INTEGRITY Multivisor,
available with hardware-assisted virtualization technologies for architectures, such as
ARM -VE, Intel VT-x and VT-d, and virtualization-enabled PowerPC. If the target
hardware is lacking hypervisor assistance, INTEGRITY Multivisor is able to modify
the guest OS to enhance performance [96]. The RTOS is certified to SIL 3 as per
IEC 61508: 2010 [97] and SIL3/4 as per EN 50128: 2011 [98]. The respective safety
certifications are displayed in Figure A10 and A11 of A.5.
Figure 22: INTEGRITY Multivisor [96].
MULTI IDE is the proprietary development platform supplied by Green Hills
Software. It is packed with a proprietary compiler and debugger. The IDE supports
C, C++, EC++, and Ada programming languages. There are analysis tools, such as
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TimeMachine and PathAnalyzer which provide a time-based view of every function
executed in the program and monitor if the code is diverting from the expected path;
DoubleCheck for tracking down bugs before running on a simulator; EventAnalyzer
for displaying time-consuming processes and optimization; Memory Allocation for
checking memory leaks, etc. The IDE can be hosted on Windows and Linux and the
code can be ported to different hardware architectures, e.g. ARM, PowerPC and
Intel [99]. MULTI IDE toolchain along with run-time libraries meet the requirements
for T3 tools as per IEC 61508-3: 2010 and also certified as SIL 4 according to EN
50128: 2011 [100]. The safety certification is displayed in Figure A12 in Appendix
A.5. INTEGRITY RTOS and the associated toolchain have been used for Train
Control Management System of Bombardier Inc. (Canada); RBC and interlocking
platforms manufactured by Sirti S.p.A. (Italy); and EVC system designed by CAF
(Spain) [101]. INTEGRITY datasheet is presented in Table B8 of Appendix B.6.
6.4 PikeOS
It is developed by SYSGO GmbH (Mainz, Germany), a subsidiary of the Thales
group since 2012. PikeOS is in use for the last three decades in more than 100
million embedded devices [102]. Like the previous RTOS platforms, PikeOS is based
on separation microkernel architecture to prevent the propagation of faults. The
applications are further secured via communication encryption and binary verification.
The RTOS is packed with a preemptive priority-based scheduler and a message-
passing type of IPC. Multiprocessing is supported with processor families from
PowerPC, x86, ARM, Sparc V8/LEON, etc. PikeOS Hypervisor enacts a hypervisor-
based environment to host different applications. It acts as para-virtualization on
the standard CPUs and hardware-assisted virtualization on ARM-VE, Intel VT, and
NXP QorIQ [103]. The RTOS is specifically certified as SIL 4 according to EN 50128:
2011 [104]. PikeOS datasheet is presented in Table B9 of Appendix B.7.
Figure 23: PikeOS hypervisor [103].
PikeOS is integrated with an Eclipse-based IDE CODEO which contains con-
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figuration tools, remote debugging (down to the hardware instruction level), target
monitoring, remote application deployment, timing analyses, etc. CODEO utilizes
GCC compiler and a proprietary debugger. This IDE uses a QEMU based hardware
simulation, Simulation Targets, to test and debug applications without requiring
any real hardware targets. CODEO can host both Windows and Linux distributions
[105]. PikeOS has been used for a SIL 4 CBTC system implemented by SAMSUNG
SDS (South Korea), with UDP based communication between the on-board and
trackside systems. In that application, PikeOS Hypervisor was implemented on top
of a MEN target hardware platform, and existing applications were ported [106].
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7 Alternative Development Environment Platforms
After reviewing through different hardware and OS platforms, the thesis will focus
now on the last block of the alternative platform, the IDE. It is a software that
enables users to develop applications and normally consists of an editor, a compiler
and/or interpreter, build automation tools, and a debugger. The developer writes
source code in the editor with the compatible programming language/s. The compiler
checks the source code, halts the process if the source code does not comply with the
language rules, and finally outputs a machine language file. The linker links this file
with other library files, checks cross-dependencies and generates an executable file.
The debugger runs this file in a controlled manner to monitor the usages of system
resources. In the vast majority of the automation industries, IEC 61131-3 compliant
languages are used. It is the third part of a ten-part open international standard IEC
61131 developed for a common PLC architecture framework to ease the demands of
a software life-cycle. The standard includes the following languages [107]:
Ladder diagram (LD): It is the oldest of the other languages. LD was devel-
oped to replace hardwired relay-based control systems. It is also the most
widely used, as the developer or the maintenance personnel requires only an
electrical background to start programming or begin troubleshooting. The
easy visualization of LD is challenged when different functions, e.g. PID loops,
trigonometry, data analysis, etc. are required to program. Also, for a larger
program, the long-running LD rungs makes program reading cumbersome.
Function Block Diagram (FBD): It provides a better visual understanding for
a viewer who is not accustomed with relay logic. The programming blocks are
wired as per the operational sequence. But for a large program, FBD can take
up a lot of screen space which can make program reading difficult. To write in
FBD, the developer needs to put in more efforts to understand the program
sequences as it is harder to make changes afterword.
Sequential Function Charts (SFC): It is similar to flowcharts as the starting
step is followed by transitions and further steps. SFC is visually most helpful
for maintenance engineers to track the progress of a process. But SFC requires
extensive planning than other languages, resulting in longer execution times.
Structured Text (ST): It is a high-level language which is faster than the
first three graphical languages. The setup is similar as Basic or C. The main
difference is that a traditional program does not reach the end until it has
finished executing everything, but an ST code runs from start to end many
times in a second. ST addresses the complex PLC programming with loops,
pointers, easy mathematical function implementations, etc. ST codes can be
encapsulated inside the other languages, which is an advantageous feature.
Instruction List (IL): It is a low-level programming language where every line
of code executes one operation. This step-by-step approach makes usages of
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mathematical functions easier. IL takes less space and enables faster execu-
tion but it is not much preferred in the industries due to lack of graphical
representations.
IEC 61131 has been criticized for not responding to the needs of the complex
decentralized industrial automation systems in terms of reusability, portability,
configurability, and interoperability. To address this issue, a component-based, open
reference architecture has been developed based on the existing PLC and DCS
function blocks. The standard, IEC 61499, replaces the cyclic IEC 61131 model and
presents an event-driven function block model where applications can be distributed
over multiple resources and devices. A range of IDEs, such as FBDK, ISaGRAF,
nxtStudio, etc. support developing applications in IEC 61499 [108].
The IDEs packaged with different OS are discussed in Chapter 6. In the following
texts, the proposed third-party IDEs from Chapter 4 will be briefly introduced.
7.1 SCADE Suite
SCADE was developed and owned by Esterel Technologies (France), until in 2012
Ansys, Inc. (USA) had acquired it. Over the years SCADE Suite has been used
in designing rail applications, e.g. interlocking, ATO, CBTC, emergency braking
systems, over-speed protection, train vacancy detection, etc. [109]. SCADE (Safety
Critical Application Development Environment) is a synchronous high-level language
to develop safety-critical embedded applications. The foundation of the synchronous
language was laid down by three academic languages namely as SIGNAL, ESTEREL,
and LUSTRE. These languages were used for real-time control applications to devise
a modular system specification, along with simulation, testing, verification and finally
producing an embedded executable code. The essential features of these languages
prompted different premier organizations and academic institutions to launch the
SCADE project, mainly based on LUSTRE. The project has become enriched by
added features, such as graphical editors; qualified code generators complying with
highest levels of safety standards in avionics, automotive, transportation and nuclear
energy applications; mixing of the dataflow type of constructs from LUSTRE with
control flow style programming of ESTEREL and SyncChart, etc. [110]. SCADE
follows Kahn Process Network theory where different nodes (processes) produce
tokens (data elements) which are transferred over a communication channel to the
destination nodes. The time between the reception of input and execution of output
must be smaller than occurring of the next input. This implies that the internal
processing time is almost null, ensuring there is no data overlapping and making the
whole process deterministic as the outputs are only determined by the inputs and
their occurrences [111].
A typical SCADE model consists of control flow constructs, such as hierarchical
state machines comprising of a finite number of states and transitions, and data
flow constructs. A corresponding transition condition must be fulfilled for a state to
move from its current state to the next state. Only one transition can be fired at a
specific time instance. As the computation order is based on functional dependencies,
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parallelism is established at the model level. A SCADE model consists of “Operator”s
or building blocks, equivalent to a function or procedure in any other languages.
In the suite, there are some basic pre-defined blocks available, e.g. mathematical,
comparison, logical, array, time, choice, bitwise, and higher-order. These basic blocks
are used to make higher-level operators. SCADE is also featured with a set of libraries
to immediately start designing models [112].
Figure 24: SCADE interface [112].
A function called “Checker” checks for any syntactical or semantic mistakes in
the prepared project. If it is error-free then a machine-readable, traceable, optimized,
target-independent, and customizable C or Ada code is generated via the proprietary
compiler, KCG. The code is deterministic as the output model always produces the
same generated code with the same KCG parameters. The compiler is certified to
SIL 3 as per IEC 61508:2010 and SIL3/4 as per EN 50128:2011 [76]. The generated
code is modular in terms of static memory allocation and finite execution duration.
Also, there are customizable RTOS adaptors available for the generated code. KCG
is packed with a dedicated Python-based API, which initiates and runs the model.
Through this API, generated code can be customized for renaming the objects and
top-level interfaces. In the SCADE suite, there are options for installing dedicated
code generators, e.g. wrappers. SCADE Suite is equipped with code analysis tools,
such as Timing and Stack Optimizer which verifies the timing requirements of the
KCG code for a specific processor target by estimating the worst-case execution time,
and monitors stack usage by an application; Design Verifier to find bugs in the early
development process; and C Compiler Verification Kit which contains C constructs
and their combinations up to a certain level of complexity that can be generated by
the compiler. SCADE has been used by CASCO (China) to develop a CBTC system
(iCMTC) for Shanghai Metro [113]. There are no other project details available in
the public domain. The datasheet of SCADE is presented in Table B10 of Appendix
B.8.
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7.2 FlexiSafe
FlexiSafe is developed by infoteam Software AG (Bubenreuth, Germany) which was
a leading co-designer for IEC 61131 standard. The company has been active on the
market for almost 40 years in the fields of transportation, infrastructure, life sciences,
and public services [114]. FlexiSafe is based on ISaGRAF framework which was
originally developed by ICS Triplex, now owned by Rockwell Automation. ISaGRAF
is scalable and portable to different hardware and operating systems associated with
both centralized and distributed architectures. It consists of a workbench and a
SoftPLC runtime. The workbench allows for the writing applications in Windows and
Linux environments with IEC 61131-3 set of programming languages along with the
relatively newly proposed IEC 61499 function blocks. It also supports functions and
function blocks written in IEC 61131-3 and Flow Chart language. The application is
compiled by the runtime to produce target-independent code (TIC) or target-specific
C source code [115].
FlexiSafe has adopted the basic ISaGRAF framework and added additional
features, e.g. a “diverse” compiler which generates language-neutral XML graphs to
check for the compiler output considering structure, flow, variables, and parameters.
The IDE has been used in 850,000 runtimes, spanning over 14 years in different
safety-critical applications. FlexiSafe kernel contains a TIC engine which is protected
by safety wrappers. The developer must ensure that non-safe applications do not
interfere with the safe elements inside the kernel. There are a bunch of development
and code analysis tools, such as Cause and Effect Editor which enables programmers
to generate codes efficiently which simplifies the safety verification process. The
IDE is integrated with functions, e.g. “bypass” and “force” which is important in
project commissioning. FlexiSafe is also equipped with Dependency Trees, which is
a list of variables derived from or contributing to the root. It is important for SIL
verification. Dependency Tree is used by a static analyzer that acts on the source or
object code while they are executing. Version control and cross-reference browser are
also packed in the FlexiSafe environment [116]. FlexiSafe runtime engine along with
the PLCopen function blocks complies as per SC3 according to IEC 61508: 2010
and SIL 4 according to EN 50128: 2011 [117]. The safety certification is displayed in
Figure A13 in Appendix A.6.
A safety-critical system, iFSC is proposed by infoteam including F75P target
hardware from MEN Mikro, QNX Neutrino RTOS Safe Kernel (QOS), and FlexiSafe
programming environment [118]. It is certified up to SIL 3 as per IEC 61508:2010
[76]. FlexiSafe/ISaGRAF has been in use for mostly on-board applications in
different railway systems worldwide. EKE Electronics (Finland) uses ISaGRAF in
its EKE-Trainnet to integrate all the on-board systems via TCN. It controls and
monitors sub-systems, such as doors, lights, HVAC, brakes and batteries, passenger
information system (PIS), etc. CAF (Spain) uses an ATP system from SEPSA
(Spain) which is based on ISaGRAF. Bombardier and Alstom have used ISaGRAF in
multiple applications to control subsystems, such as traction, braking, speed limit, air
conditioning, etc. SP Teknik (Denmark), in cooperation with NAUTSILUS (Russia),
has developed a PIS based on Linux, where ISaGRAF applications can be ported.
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Figure 25: FlexiSafe environment [116].
The other use cases involve PIS from Kontron (Belgium), traction control in Alstom’s
TestStand controller, on-board control system in Alspa CX90 from Soprano Industry
(France), door control in Virgin Trains (UK), Prague Metro’s diagnostic platform by
UniControls (Czech Republic), etc. [119]. The datasheet of FlexiSafe is presented in
Table B11 of Appendix B.9.
7.3 Prover Trident
It is offered by Prover Technology AB (Stockholm, Sweden) which is a company
focussing on formal methods and software development for safety-critical systems
[120]. The company aims at reducing the duration of railway interlocking project
developments by 50%, with the introduction of the Prover Trident suite which consists
of the following elements [121]:
PiSPEC IP: It is a predicate logic-based formal language which models signalling
requirements in a clear way to avoid discrepancies in writing the specifications
by hand. PiSPEC IP has a strict type system and object orientation covering
classes, inheritances, and interfaces. The generated formal requirements can
be stored in a library for future reuse.
Prover iLock: This is an IDE which translates the generic applications formal-
ized by PiSPEC IP to a specific application by graphical configuration and
automatic source code generation. In the editor, rail tracks are drawn and
trackside elements are placed from the libraries in a drag-and-drop manner. It
consists of other features, such as iLock Verifier to formally verify whether the
generated code has satisfied the system requirements; iLock Simulator to debug
and perform functional testing of all the test cases; and iLock Documenter for
generating control tables and test/verification reports.
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Figure 26: Prover iLock [122].
Prover Certifier: It is an EN 50128 SIL 4 certified sign-off verification tool
which generates safety evidence. This tool minimizes human dependency by
eliminating the need for code reviews and safety testing.
The Prover Trident package or parts of it are in use for several railway applications.
The New York City Transit uses Prover iLock Verifier for formal verification of the
interlocking software which is based on Westrace Mk II (Siemens), MELLOCK
(Mitsubishi), iVPI (Alstom), and Microlok II (Ansaldo STS). Canadian Pacific
implements the complete Prover iLock package to develop applications for the
interlocking system built with ElectroLogIXS (General Electric) and Microlok II
(Ansaldo STS). Stockholm Metro (Sweden) and Network Rail (UK) have used the
complete Prover iLock suite for developing the interlocking system based on target
hardware platforms from General Electric and Siemens, respectively. Paris Metro
(RATP, France), Bane NOR (Norway) and Infrabel (Belgium) uses Prover Certifier,
iLock Verifier and PiSPEC, respectively [123]. The datasheet of Prover Trident is
presented in Table B12 of Appendix B.10.
7.4 CODESYS Safety
CODESYS is one of the leading IEC 61131-3 automation software, produced by
3S-Smart Software Solutions (Kempten, Germany). It has been used in over 2 million
applications in different industries. This IDE can be applied on CODESYS compatible
target hardware platforms. CODESYS Safety comes as an add-on package for the
standard IDE, CODESYS Development System. The safety controller appears as a
sub-node of the standard controller with specific application, tasks, I/O in the editor
layout. Different safety controllers communicate via Safety NetVars. The developer
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can program the safe functions via FBD safety editor and non-safe functions are
designed with IEC 61131-3 set of languages. The IDE includes additional safety
functions, such as safe versioning, change tracking, safe debug mode, etc. The
runtime toolkit package includes, runtime system components, system configurator,
adaptive interfaces, and manuals. CODESYS Test Manager produces automated test
cases, instructions, and reports. The IDE supports target platforms from TriCore,
ARM, and PowerPC [124].
Figure 27: CODESYS Safety environment [124].
The runtime system and PLCopen function blocks with associated libraries and
fieldbus configuration are certified to SIL 3 according to IEC 61508: 2010. The
programming system compiler complies with the tool class T3 requirements as per
IEC 61508-3 [125]. The safety certification is displayed in Figure A14 in Appendix
A.7. The safety package includes, certification reports, test framework, automated
test scripts for verification of the runtime system, and the compiler. CODESYS Safety
has been in use for applications from Bosch Rexroth AG, Berghof Automationstechnik
GmbH, Yacoub Automation GmbH, KEB GmbH and Kendrion Kuhnke Automation
GmbH [124]. The datasheet is presented in Table B13 of Appendix B.11.
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8 Final Cost-based Analysis
Based on the thesis methodology prescribed in Chapter 4 and the different alternative
hardware, OS, and IDEs described in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively,
a comparative analysis is presented in the following texts. This discourse refers to
the respective datasheets in the appendices. Information regarding prices is not
considered, as per the non-disclosure agreements with different vendors.
8.1 Hardware: Cost-based Analysis
This section compares the alternative hardware platforms, CSP and MH50C, based
on the datasheets presented in Table B4 in Appendix B.2, and Table B5 in Appendix
B.3, respectively. The comparative parameters are as follows:
CPU Architecture
The modern CPU architecture comes in multi-core, multi-threaded offerings. The
benefits of threads can only be capitalized by writing suitable applications. For
example, in case of an application that mostly does calculations, one thread per core
is a reasonable decision. This is because more threads might result in an overhead.
But in case of I/O operations, higher number of threads are required to run parallel
processes to cater to all the requests within a specified time limit. If the interlocking
applications are developed to leverage the advantages of parallel programming, the
number of threads could be a vital factor. The NXP QorIQ P1/P2 processors used
in the CSP are of PowerPC e500 architecture. The processors in the Master and
Checker CPUs are of the dual-core single-thread type and the I/O processor is of
the single-core single-thread architecture. The MH50C uses three Intel Atom E680T
processors which are based on single-core dual-thread type Tunnel Creek (Queens
Bay Platform) architecture. These multiple threads enable thread-level parallelism
which in turn improves memory miss latency. Also, the processors support Intel
VT-x, meaning any RTOS capable with virtualization capabilities can be easily
integrated with the MH50C platform.
Clock Frequency
Although CPU clock frequency is an important parameter mostly when it comes
to comparing between processors from the same family of architectures, it is still
considered here for the sake of the argument. The comparison can only be established
by running same programs on both the platforms and calculating the respective
cycle times. The CSP processors are clocked in the range of 800-1200 MHz while the
processors in the MH50C offer a frequency of 1600 MHz.
CPU Synchronization
For a safety-critical hardware platform, synchronization between redundant CPUs is
an important factor. SMART EC offers a unique data lockstep mode which establishes
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determinism for modern CPU architectures. It provides both hardware (SRB) and
software (DCA) arrangements to synchronize the CSP CPUs. Despite following the
old hard lockstep technique, the MH50C provides software based EN 50128: 2011
(SIL 4) and IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3) certified proprietary function SyncLayer to
synchronize two CPs in F75P. This eliminates the hardware maintenance efforts
during the platform’s life-cycle.
Memory
Although the L2 and L1 instruction cache memory associated with both the platforms
are same (512 KB and 32 KB, respectively), the L1 data cache in the CSP (32 KB) is
bigger than that of in the MH50C (24 KB). Therefore, it is easier to fetch frequently
used data to be used in CPU operations for the CSP platform. The maximum RAM
that can be attached with the MH50C platform is 2 GB (DDR2), whereas the CSP
can accommodate a maximum of 4 GB RAM (DDR3). DDR3 type of memory has
some obvious advantages over DDR2 in terms of higher bandwidth and optimized
power consumption. The cache and the main memory of the CSP processors are
equipped with error-correcting code (ECC) mechanism, which can detect and correct
data corruption. The MH50C does not offer any ECC support.
I/O
In railways, mostly digital I/O are used along with counter modules for axle counters.
I/O capacity is an important factor for choosing a particular hardware platform.
SMART EC provides a single module (cIOU-DIO) to accommodate both digital
inputs and outputs. The output channels can be also be used for frequency counting.
Up to 48 I/O channels can be accommodated in each CSP platform. The I/O capacity
can be increased by integrating the Expansion Box Platform via safe communication
protocols. MEN Mikro offers separate modules for both inputs (K2) and outputs
(K1 and K7). There is no counter module available as of now. In one platform, 24
I/O channels can be used at SIL 4. A single MH50C platform is capable to handle
up to 1500 DI and 600 DO.
Communication
In a safety-critical platform, safe communication is established between all the control
hardware as per EN 50159. Traditionally, vendors supply the PLC package with their
proprietary communication protocols. SMART EC has not publicly disclosed any
information regarding their protocol. There are separate communication modules for
third-party data transfers via MVB, CAN and UART. MEN Mikro uses EN 50159
certified FSoE protocol to guarantee deterministic data transfer with a failure rate of
10−9 packets per hour and maximum response time of 5 ms. The proprietary PACY
framework acts on top of the FSoE. There are provisions of external communications
via MVB, CAN, and Profinet.
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Operating Temperature
To be globally acceptable, a hardware platform must be tolerant enough to be installed
in various climatic situations. A wider temperature range helps to reduce costs and
efforts related to cooling and/or heating arrangements. Both the alternative platforms
can operate in temperatures as low as –40◦C, which is a significant improvement
from the present HIMA platform. For the CSP, the upper threshold for operating
temperature in the open rack condition is +60◦C. With integrated fan trays, the
platform can work efficiently up to +70◦C. The MH50C is capable to operate at
+70◦C in the open condition and +85◦C with forced cooling arrangements.
Certification
It is one of the deciding factors in choosing the alternative platforms, as described in
Chapter 4. The hardware platforms must conform to the highest levels of safety as
per IEC 61508 and EN 5012x. SMART EC underwent for certification of the CSP
along with VxWorks 653 RTOS. There is no unique certification for the hardware
platform itself, meaning that the customers would have to go through a strenuous
certification effort if choosing for a different RTOS. MEN Mikro provides separate
SIL certifications for both the standalone CPU module (F75P) and the whole package
along with the QOS BSP. This signifies that if the customer opts for an RTOS other
than QOS, there will be minimal certification efforts involved.
Planned Product Life
Depending on the frequently changing market, vendors update their electronic
components with newer versions for better speed, memory chip density, storage
device capacity, data transmission rate, etc. This could cause product obsolescence
for the customer in the near future. The suppliers must commit to their customers
with a planned product life, guaranteeing that in case of failures, the affected product
would be replaced with the same versions. SMART EC promises a product life of 15
years for the CSP, whereas the MH50C has a life-span of 10 years.
Brand Value
SMART EC has provided documented use cases where the CSP and other platforms
are used as illustrated in Chapter 5.1. In most of these applications legacy systems
are upgraded and either the old I/O modules are kept or new customized ones are
provided. In case of the MH50C, although it has been in use for wayside, rolling
stock, and ERTMS applications, there are no publications available in the public
domain.
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Cost Assignment
Table 4: Comparative analysis of alternative hardware platforms.
Parameter Weight CSP MH50C
Score Cost Score Cost
CPU Architecture 1 4 4 5 5
CPU Frequency 0.5 4 2 5 2.5
CPU Synchronization 0.5 4 2 5 2.5
Memory 0.5 5 2.5 4 2
I/O 1 5 5 4 4
Communication 1 4 4 5 5
Operating Temperature 0.5 4 2 5 2.5
Certification 1 4 4 5 5
Planned Product Life 1 5 5 4 4
Brand Value 1 5 5 4 4
Standalone Hardware Cost C(H1) =35.5 C(H2) =36.5
8.2 Operating Systems: Cost-based Analysis
This section compares the alternative OS platforms, VxWorks 7, QOS, INTEGRITY,
and PikeOS, based on the datasheets presented in the Table B6 in Appendix B.4,
Table B7 in Appendix B.5, Table B8 in Appendix B.6, and Table B9 in Appendix
B.7, respectively. The comparative parameters are as follows:
Scheduling Policy
An OS is equipped with scheduling algorithms to decide about which processes are
going to be served, while keeping in mind various criteria, such as CPU utilization,
throughput, wait time, response time, etc. Both VxWorks 7 and QOS are equipped
with the popular priority-based preemptive schedulers. Also, there is a provision
to use other schedulers, such as round-robin, adaptive scheduling, etc. as per the
requirements. INTEGRITY and PikeOS offer only the priority-based preemption
scheme to schedule the processes.
AMP/BMP/SMP Support
In modern hardware architecture, several CPUs share the same resources. Depending
on whether all the CPUs execute the same piece of program/process/thread there are
different multiprocessing techniques. In asymmetric multiprocessing (AMP) multiple
OS use their own specific CPUs, whereas in symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) a
single OS can use multiple CPUs simultaneously. The bound multiprocessing (BMP)
is similar to SMP, but the user has the control to select the processor on which a
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particular thread would run. BMP has some distinct advantages, e.g. elimination
of the possibility of cache thrashing, simpler debugging, easier migration of legacy
software, etc. A particular RTOS must be equipped with all the three techniques
giving the user a wide range of options to optimize resources. Both VxWorks 7 and
QOS are equipped with AMP, BMP and SMP techniques, whereas for INTEGRITY
and PikeOS there is no BMP support.
Networking
This feature allows an RTOS to interface with other systems. If there are more
networking protocols available, then a platform is more flexible to integrate with
different kind of systems. Apart from the traditional TCP/IP, VxWorks 7 is packed
with the new “buzz” time-sensitive networking (TSN) which enables hierarchical
automation pyramid elements of different bandwidths to connect with each other.
TSN guarantees that higher-level protocol layers can share a common network
architecture, and latency times of real-time critical data can be guaranteed throughout
the network. The other three alternative RTOS platforms have only the TCP/IP
capabilities to offer.
Connectivity
An OS must support different kinds of interface standards to connect with different
devices for seamless real-time data transfer. Generally, universal serial bus (USB) is
the typical industrial standard along with IEEE 1394 (high-performance serial bus).
An alternative OS platform must also be equipped with the newer standards, as offered
by the telecommunications industry, for secure and faster data transfer. VxWorks
7 offers OPC-UA and CAN possibilities whereas QNX and INTEGRITY provide
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and NFC capabilities. PikeOS is packed with USB capabilities
only.
Certification
It is very critical that the alternative OS platform must meet manufacturer design
process requirements of corresponding SIL values to achieve sufficient integrity against
systematic errors of design. Apart from the generic safety standard IEC 61508, the
RTOS must also comply with the railway specific EN 50128 to save certification
efforts from the customer’s end. Both VxWorks and QOS provide SIL 3 capabilities
as per IEC 61508 when used as individual products. Also, both of the respective
vendors have collaborated with SMART EC and MEN Mikro to produce SIL 4
certification according to EN 50128. The downside is, if VxWorks and QNX are
used on other alternative hardware platforms, then the certification efforts will be
time-consuming and costly. But for INTEGRITY and PikeOS, there are separate
IEC 61508 (SIL 3) and EN 50128 (SIL 4) certifications available.
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Brand Value
A particular OS is also judged by its lifetime in the industry, collaboration with
different rail vendors, and future roadmap for the newer versions to avoid obsolescence.
Both Wind River and QNX/Blackberry are in the OS market for more than three
decades, experiencing through the changing industrial needs. They have a strong
portfolio of rail integrators. Both these vendors have a high reputation when it comes
to a new API for a third-party vendor or delivering a new BSP for a new hardware
platform. Green Hills Software is a dominant force in the defence industries in the
USA, delivering generations of INTEGRITY products satisfying stringent safety
requirements. INTEGRITY is now being adopted into rail applications too. SYSGO
is a rail-focused RTOS vendor, but their portfolio is not stronger than Wind River
and QNX/Blackberry.
All the RTOS are bundled with their respective IDEs as described in Chapter 6.
This gives the customers an option to start developing the applications right away,
without requiring any other third-party platforms.
Programming Language
All these IDEs are based on high-level programming languages to cater to a broad
range of customers with different needs. Apart from the traditional C and C++
languages, Workbench, Momentics and MULTI IDE offer support for Python, Ada,
and Rust etc. The PikeOS IDE, CODEO, can accommodate only C and C++.
Host OS Support
The IDE should be flexible enough to be hosted on a range of general-purpose OS.
Workbench, MULTI IDE and CODEO can be hosted on different versions of Windows
and Linux, whereas Momentics is compatible with macOS also.
Target OS Support
The IDE compilers should be able to produce a code that can be ported to any other
OS. Other than the respective legacy RTOS platforms, applications from Workbench,
MULTI IDE and CODEO can be ported to Windows, Linux, OSE, ThreadX, etc.
Codes written MULTI IDE can even be ported to VxWorks 7. But Momentics can
port applications only to the legacy QNX OS.
Certification
The IDE toolchains should fulfil the requirements for T3 tools as per IEC 61508 and
EN 50128. MULTI IDE has the required certifications for both the standards, while
the others have been certified as per IEC 61508 only.
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Cost Assignment
Table 5: Comparative analysis of alternative OS platforms.
Parameter Weight VxWorks7 QOS INTEGRITY PikeOS
Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost
Scheduling Policy 1 5 5 5 5 3 3 4 4
AMP/BMP/SMP Support 1 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3
Networking 0.5 5 2.5 4 2 4 2 4 2
Connectivity 0.5 5 2.5 5 2.5 5 2.5 3 1.5
Certification 1 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
Brand Value 1 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
IDE Properties
Parameter Weight Workbench Momentics MULTI IDE CODEO
Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost
Languages 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4
Host OS Support 0.5 4 2 5 2.5 4 2 4 2
Target OS Support 0.5 5 2.5 4 2 5 2.5 5 2.5
Certification 1 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4
Standalone OS Cost C(O1)=37.5 C(O2)=37 C(O3)=34 C(O4)=32
8.3 Development Environment: Cost-based Analysis
This section compares the alternative IDE platforms, SCADE, FlexiSafe, Prover
Trident, and CODESYS Safety, based on the datasheets presented in Table B10 in
Appendix B.8, Table B11 in Appendix B.9, Table B12 in Appendix B.10, and Table
B13 in Appendix B.11, respectively. The comparative parameters are as follows:
Framework
It is the foundation which allows the developer to access a specific set of tools to
write programs. The proposed IDE should preferably be equipped with similar
features of the present SILworX platform to ease the development efforts. FlexiSafe
and CODESYS Safety offer similar IDE layout as of the present platform with
the availability of IEC 61131-3 compliant language tools. Furthermore, FlexiSafe
offers integration of IEC 61499 function blocks and C language. Prover Trident is a
unique IDE where informal system requirements are first transformed into formal
design principles, and then applications are developed by drawing tracks and linking
subsequent library elements. The learning curve for this IDE is steeper than that of
the others. But once the formal requirements are ready, applications can be written
in a short time. In SCADE, model-based programming is employed with hierarchical
state machines and data flows. The modular programming offers the highest flexibility
to change the application parts with minimal efforts. But the problem with this type
of programming is to find the stable states for a large interlocking application. If not
62
properly planned, it is quite possible to drive the system into deadlocks. Without
any prior knowledge of finite state machines, developing applications in SCADE is
quite complicated.
Development Tools
These are very important gadgets for efficient programming. SCADE, FlexiSafe and
CODESYS Safety contain the basic tools for software development, such as editor,
compilers, debuggers, linkers, version controllers, etc. Apart with that there are
tools for static analyses, APIs to include third party software, extensive ready-to-use
libraries to start developing programs instantly, verification and validation tools
for design and written code, etc. In addition to these features, Prover Trident is
equipped with Prover Certifier which is the only sign-off tool present in the railway
sector. It verifies the application and produces safety evidence according to EN
50128 (SIL 4). This significantly reduces time and cost spent on running test cases
and doing code reviews. As mentioned in Chapter 7.3, a lot of customers have only
used this certification tool from the Trident package, to verify their own codes.
Certification
To develop a safety-critical application, the run time engine, workbench, and the
associated libraries offered by the IDE must be certified to the highest levels of safety
as per the generic and rail-specific standards to ensure that a safe code is ported to
the target system. SCADE, FlexiSafe and Prover Trident are certified to SIL3 as
per IEC 61508:2010 and EN 50128:2011, while CODESYS Safety is only certified as
per the generic standard. This might make the rail application developers sceptical
about using CODESYS Safety.
Application
The brand value and examples of use cases make a certain IDE platform more
acceptable to the user. As software updates are very frequent, there should be a
roadmap available for the customers to check for the backward compatibility. Out of
all the IDEs, SCADE has the best reputation and great collaborations with different
railway vendors. If not for writing the main applications, different elements from
SCADE suite have been used for various parts of a project management. But most
of these examples are not available in the public domain. Due to the legacy of
ISaGRAF, FlexiSafe has an extensive range of applications around the world for both
on-board and wayside cases as presented in Chapter 7.2. Prover Trident has also
been used for both wayside and on-board projects. Mainly, the verification toolkit
Prover Certifier was customers’ choice to check if the written code is SIL 4 capable.
Being a new technology in the respectively rigid railway market, Prover Trident is
taking some time to gain confidence. Although the generic CODESYS platform is
quite popular in manufacturing automation for the past two decades, the absence
of rail-specific certification and being a target-specific platform makes it the least
suitable choice for an alternative IDE platform.
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Cost Assignment
Table 6: Comparative analysis of alternative IDE platforms.
Parameter Weight SCADE FlexiSafe Prover Trident CODESYS Safety
Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost
Framework 1 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 5
Development Tools 0.5 4 2 4 2 5 2.5 4 2
Certification 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3
Application 1 4 4 5 5 4 4 3 3
Standalone IDE Cost C(O1)=14 C(O2)=17 C(O3)=15.5 C(O4)=13
8.4 Compatibility: Cost-based Analysis
The comparative parameters are as follows:
BSP Availability
It is a program which acts as the interface between the RTOS and the processor,
memory, and system buses of the target hardware platform. Typically it is linked
with a set of libraries to provide support for interrupt generation and handling,
memory mapping, and clock synchronization. The BSP enables the RTOS kernel
to utilize the hardware resources. The chosen alternative OS platform should be
able to supply a BSP suiting the target hardware architecture. Wind River provides
VxWorks 7 BSP for architectures used in both the CSP and MH 50C platforms.
Moreover, SMART EC and Wind River have a collaborative railway specific safety
certification together. Similarly, a QOS BSP is available to work on the MH50C.
For the CSP, Blackberry offers the generic QNX Neutrino BSP. Since QOS is based
on Neutrino, a specific BSP for CSP can be easily developed. Although there are
no certification efforts from SYSGO GmbH with the chosen alternative hardware
platforms, it offers BSPs for the corresponding architecture families. This means
that there are no exclusive, tried and tested BSPs available. Kontron’s upcoming
SAFe-VX hardware is under the combined certification process with PikeOS, which
makes it a probable future option to be used as an alternative platform [126]. Like
SYSGO, Green Hills Software provides BSPs for the all the popular architectures,
but without any collaborative efforts with hardware vendors discussed in this thesis.
Collaborative Certification Efforts
As stated earlier, there are collaborations between SMART EC and Wind River,
and MEN Mikro and QNX/Blackberry. These are also taken into account in the
comparison.
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Code Portability
It is a parameter of the highest priority as the compiled source code must run on the
chosen OS platform. The compiled C or Ada codes from FlexiSafe and Prover Trident
can be ported to any safe RTOS. This gives the system integrator a wide range of
options to choose from different RTOS based on the project requirements. Barring
QNX, the generated code from SCADE’s KCG can be ported to other alternative
RTOS discussed in the thesis. ANSYS provides customizable adaptors to adapt to
other RTOS. CODESYS Safety codes can only be ported to VxWorks 7 and QOS.
Cost Assignment
Table 7: Comparative analysis of compatibility factors between alternative platforms.
Hardware Weight VxWorks7 QOS INTEGRITY PikeOS
Platform Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost
Parameter: BSP Availability
CSP 1 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3
MH50C 1 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3
Parameter: Collaborative Certification Effort
CSP 1 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3
MH50C 1 3 3 5 5 3 3 3 3
OS Weight SCADE FlexiSafe Prover Trident CODESYS Safety
Platform Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost Score Cost
Parameter: Code Portability
All 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 3
Simplified Table
Hardware Platform VxWorks7 QOS INTEGRITY PikeOS
CSP C(H1, O1)=10 C(H1, O2)=8 C(H1, O3)=6 C(H1, O4)=6
MH50C C(H2, O1)=8 C(H2, O2)=10 C(H2, O3)=6 C(H2, O4)=6
OS Platform SCADE FlexiSafe Prover Trident CODESYS Safety
All C(Ok, E1)=4 C(Ok, E2)=5 C(Ok, E3)=5 C(Ok, E4)=3
8.5 Final Cost-based Analysis
In this section, the final costs of all the possible 32 combinations are presented. For
example, the cost of an alternative platform containing CSP, VxWorks 7 and SCADE
as hardware, OS and IDE respectively is calculated as follows:
C(H1, O1, E1) = C(H1) + C(O1) + C(E1) + C(H1, O1) + C(O1, E1)
= 35.5 + 37.5 + 14 + 5 + 5 + 4
= 101
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Similarly, all the other costs are calculated as represented in the Table 8.
Table 8: Final costs of the possible combinations.
Combination Cost
CSP + VxWorks 7 + SCADE C1(H1, O1, E1) 101
CSP + VxWorks 7 + FlexiSafe C2(H1, O1, E2) 105
CSP + VxWorks 7 + Prover Trident C3(H1, O1, E3) 103.5
CSP + VxWorks 7 + CODESYS Safety C4(H1, O1, E4) 99
CSP + QOS + SCADE C5(H1, O2, E1) 98.5
CSP + QOS + FlexiSafe C6(H1, O2, E2) 102.5
CSP + QOS + Prover Trident C7(H1, O2, E3) 101
CSP + QOS + CODESYS Safety C8(H1, O2, E4) 96.5
CSP + INTEGRITY + SCADE C9(H1, O3, E1) 93.5
CSP + INTEGRITY + FlexiSafe C10(H1, O3, E2) 97.5
CSP + INTEGRITY + Prover Trident C11(H1, O3, E3) 96
CSP + INTEGRITY + CODESYS Safety C12(H1, O3, E4) 91.5
CSP + PikeOS + SCADE C13(H1, O4, E1) 91.5
CSP + PikeOS + FlexiSafe C14(H1, O4, E2) 95.5
CSP + PikeOS + Prover Trident C15(H1, O4, E3) 94
CSP + PikeOS + CODESYS Safety C16(H1, O4, E4) 92
MH50C + VxWorks 7 + SCADE C17(H2, O1, E1) 100
MH50C + VxWorks 7 + FlexiSafe C18(H2, O1, E2) 104
MH50C + VxWorks 7 + Prover Trident C19(H2, O1, E3) 102.5
MH50C + VxWorks 7 + CODESYS Safety C20(H2, O1, E4) 98
MH50C + QOS + SCADE C21(H2, O2, E1) 101.5
MH50C + QOS + FlexiSafe C22(H2, O2, E2) 105.5
MH50C + QOS + Prover Trident C23(H2, O2, E3) 104
MH50C + QOS + CODESYS Safety C24(H2, O2, E4) 99.5
MH50C + INTEGRITY + SCADE C25(H2, O3, E1) 94.5
MH50C + INTEGRITY + FlexiSafe C26(H2, O3, E2) 98.5
MH50C + INTEGRITY + Prover Trident C27(H2, O3, E3) 97
MH50C + INTEGRITY + CODESYS Safety C28(H2, O3, E4) 92.5
MH50C + PikeOS + SCADE C29(H2, O4, E1) 92.5
MH50C + PikeOS + FlexiSafe C30(H2, O4, E2) 96.5
MH50C + PikeOS + Prover Trident C31(H2, O4, E3) 95
MH50C + PikeOS + CODESYS Safety C32(H2, O4, E4) 90.5
As per the calculations, the combination C22(H2, O2, E2) has the highest cost of
105.5. This platform is based on MH50C, QOS, and FlexiSafe. The reasons are, the
capable hardware architecture of MH50C; the reputation of QNX Neutrino kernel;
the collaborative certification between MH50C and QOS BSP; the capability of
producing TIC by FlexiSafe along with the IEC 61131-3 friendly environment; and
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the proposed iFSC system by infoteam Software AG with extensive applications in
the railway sector. C2(H1, O1, E2) is the close second to the best combination, with
a cost of 105 because of similar reasons, e.g. collaborative efforts between SMART
EC, and Wind River and the abilities of FlexiSafe. Other combinations, such as
C18(H2, O1, E2) and C3(H1, O1, E3) have costs closer to the highest one due to Wind
River’s readymade BSP for MH50C and Prover Trident’s efficient way of developing
interlocking applications, respectively.
The worst combinations are C32(H2, O4, E4) and C12(H1, O3, E4) with costs of
90.5 and 91.5, respectively. This is because of insufficient target specific BSP support
from Green Hills Software and SYSGO GmbH; lack of rail-specific safety certification
for CODESYS Safety and its inability to port code to the concerned OS platforms;
and mediocre brand values of INTEGRITY and PikeOS compared to the other
OS alternatives. Similar costs are observed in the combinations C13(H1, O4, E1)
and C29(H2, O4, E1) with 91.5 and 92.5, respectively. This is due to the previously
mentioned BSP issues and higher learning curve of SCADE environment.
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9 Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, different COTS and safety-certified components required for building an
interlocking system have been investigated. Based on the technical characteristics and
interoperability, these components and their combinations have been awarded with
costs. To maintain simplicity, the hardware, OS, and IDE platforms are considered
as linear systems and the final cost is deduced on the basis of the superposition
principle. This can be a point of argumentation as the mathematical models of the
hardware, OS and IDE can exhibit non-linearity. Also, the study is made with the
assumption that all the elements are at their steady-states. The dynamic factors,
such as hardware and software ageing should also be taken into account, regardless
of the reliability and availability values prescribed in the respective safety certificates.
In the thesis, the code portabilities of different third-party IDEs to the concerned
OS platforms are discussed and graded. In that analysis, it has been observed that
applications from FlexiSafe and Prover Trident can be ported to any OS and thus
these are awarded with best costs. Contrarily, SCADE does not offer any portability
to QOS, and CODESYS Safety caters to only VxWorks and QNX. Therefore these
two IDEs are graded poorly. This has affected the total cost of the whole platform
combination. But if these third-party IDEs are not considered and the application is
developed solely on the bundled IDEs offered by the alternative OS platforms, then
the final cost analysis might look different. For example, the combination of CSP and
VxWorks 7 along with the associated IDE, Workbench, could be a better solution
than the “best” solution of MH50C, QOS and FlexiSafe, as presented in Chapter
8.5. If the project is concerned with the development of an RBC, where high-level
languages, e.g. C or C++ are required to develop interfaces with interlocking systems,
then there is no need to avail IEC 61131-3 language support from the third-party
IDEs. Additionally, all the bundled IDEs are packed with industry-specific APIs to
head-start in programming. In the thesis, Kontron’s SAFe-VX platform, based on
Intel Xeon processors and PikeOS, has not been considered as it is still under the
certification process [126]. Also, PSS 4000-R from Pilz GmbH & Co. KG has not been
surveyed, as it is a HIMA-like platform based on proprietary OS and IDE platforms
[127]. Apart from these, the thesis does not consider the possible migration policies
of the proposed alternative platforms. This is an important factor in assigning costs
to each combination. The product prices are not included in the thesis to respect
the non-disclosure agreements. In reality, the price vs. performance trade-off would
be one of the important conclusive parameters. Furthermore, unquantifiable factors,
such as organizational vision in terms of project demands, application developers’
willingness to go past the learning curve and get accustomed with a new software
platform, legal issues associated with importing products of non-EU origin, etc.
should also be taken into account. The idea of an open control system can be
challenged by the fact there would be a lot of things to be taken care of in case the
hardware, OS, and IDE platforms are from different suppliers with different life-cycle
issues. Especially, the system integrators are less concerned about the OS, as Don
Ulrich of Stone Technologies have summed it up by commenting “We don’t care what
OS is in a Siemens controller for instance - the customer goes back to the vendor.
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People are happy to have PLCs (especially for larger systems), happy to have GE,
Schneider, etc. because the long-term maintainability is done by them.” [128].
The thesis has pointed out that the limited memory capacity of the present
platform is one of the motivations to investigate for a new platform. But from the
comparative analysis performed in the thesis, which is a hypothetical guesstimate
from the respective product descriptions, it is not possible to figure out about the
amount of usable memory that would be available in the CSP or MH50C platform
after installing a particular OS. Therefore, the future work involves, acquiring test-
beds from the hardware, operating system, and development environment vendors;
developing and executing sample applications; and comparing the results with the
present HIMA platform benchmarks, such as total execution time and memory
consumption of a program and the related data. These variables decide the number
of CPUs required for a particular interlocking application. Once a specific platform
is chosen, migration policies from the hardware and software perspectives need to
be devised. It is also of special interest to check whether the selected components
conform to the ERTMS, EULYNX and RCA baselines.
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A Certifications
The nature and validity of certifications of all the products discussed in the thesis,
have been thoroughly checked from the certification agencies’ databases. This section
presents only the publicly accessible certification copies of the products discussed in
the thesis.
A.1 HIMA
HIMax
The following illustrates certification of HIMax system according to EN 50126: 1999
(SIL 4), EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 4), EN 50129: 2003 (SIL 4) and EN 50159: 2010 by
TÜV SÜD.
Figure A1: HIMax SIL certification [129].
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HIMatrix
The following illustrates certification of HIMatrix system according to EN 50126:
1999 (SIL 4), EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 4) and EN 50129: 2003 (SIL 4) by TÜV SÜD.
Figure A2: HIMax SIL certification [130].
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SILworX
The following illustrates certification of SILworX IDE by TÜV Rheinland, as per
the requirements set by IEC 61508-3: 2010 for tool class T3.
Figure A3: SILworx IDE certification [131].
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The following illustrates certification of SILworX functon block library, by TÜV
Rheinland. This library can be used for SIL 3 applications according to IEC 61508:
2010.
Figure A4: SILworX function block certification [132].
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A.2 ControlSafe Platfrom (CSP)
The following illustrates certification of the CSP and ControlSafe Software (VxWorks
653) certification according to EN 50126: 1999 (SIL 4), EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 4), EN
50129: 2003 (SIL 4) and IEC 61508: 2010 by TÜV SÜD.
Figure A5: CSP SIL certification [62].
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A.3 VxWorks 7
The following illustrates certification of VxWorks 7 according to IEC 61508: 2010
(SIL 3) by TÜV SÜD.
Figure A6: VxWorks 7 SIL certification [83].
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The following illustrates certification of the proprietary DIAB compiler from
Wind River by TÜV SÜD. It is used in the IDE, Workbench 3.3, bundled with
VxWorks 7. The compiler fulfills the criteria of tool class T3 set by IEC 61508-3:
2010.
Figure A7: WxWorks IDE SIL certification [86].
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A.4 QNX OS for Safety (QOS)
The following illustrates certification of QOS and the associated toolchain according
to IEC 61508: 2010 (SC 3) by TÜV Rheinland.
Figure A8: QOS SIL certification [92].
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The following illustrates certification of QNX Hypervisor for Safety according to
IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3) by TÜV Rheinland.
Figure A9: QNX Hypervisor for Safety SIL certification [133].
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A.5 INTEGRITY
The following illustrates certification of INTEGRITY RTOS according to IEC 61508:
2010 (SC 3) by exida.
Figure A10: INTEGRITY RTOS SIL certification [97].
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The following illustrates certification of INTEGRITY RTOS according to EN
50128: 2011 (SIL 3/4) by exida.
Figure A11: INTEGRITY RTOS SIL certification [98].
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The following illustrates certification of the proprietary MULTI IDE from Green
Hills Software LLC by exida. It establishes that the toolchain and runtime libraries
of the IDE is certified according to IEC 61508: 2010 and EN 50128: 2011 (SIL3/4).
Figure A12: INTEGRITY IDE SIL certification [100].
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A.6 FlexiSafe
The following illustrates certification of the runtime engine, workbench and PLCopen
funciton block libraries in FlexiSafe. TÜV Rheinland has certified this IDE according
to EN 50128: 2014 (SIL 4) and IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3).
Figure A13: FlexiSafe SIL certification [117].
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A.7 CODESYS Safety
The following illustrates certification of the runtime engine, workbench, funciton
block libraries and fieldbus configuration in CODESYS Safety. TÜV Rheinland has
certified this IDE according to IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3).
Figure A14: CODESYS Safety SIL certification [125].
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B Datasheets
B.1 HIMA
Table B1: HIMax and HIMatrix CPU Module Datasheet.
X-CPU X-CPU HIMatrix
01 [42] 31 [43] F35 03 [45]
Parameter: Processor Details
Microprocessor PowerPC
Supply Voltage 24 VDC, -15. . . +20%
Current Consumption 1.4 A 0.72 A 0.5 A
Parameter: Memory Details
Dedicated Memory 128 MB DDRAM
Memory Protection CRC
Program and Data Memory 10 MB less 4 5 MB less 64 5 MB less 64kB for CRCs kB for CRCs kB for CRCs
No. of User Programs Maximum: 32
No. of Event Definitions Maximum: 20000
Non-volatile Event Buffer 5000 events
Date/Time Buffer Min. 5 days, gold capacitor
Parameter: Communication Interface: Ethernet
Connector 4 x RJ-45 2 x RJ-45 4 x RJ-45
Speed
10BASE-T, 10BASE-T, 10BASE-T,
100BASE-Tx, 100BASE-Tx. 100BASE-Tx.
1000BASE-T.
Auto-negotiation/crossover Yes
Parameter: Communication Interface: Fieldbus
Connector X-COM 9-pole D-sub
Protocols Safeethernet, OPC, SNTP, PROFIsafe,PROFINET, ComUserTask, Modbus.
Connections Total: 255, Redundant: 255,Between two controllers: 64.
Parameter: Environmental Specifications
Protection IEC/EN 61131-2 Protection class III, IP20
Operating Temperature 0...+60◦C
Storage Temperature -40. . . +85◦C
Maximum Relative Humidity 95%
Pollution IEC/EN 60664-1 Pollution degree II
Altitude <2000 m
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Table B2: HIMax DI and DO Module Datasheet.
DI Module Parameter X-DI X-DI X-DI16 01 [134] 32 01 [135] 64 01 [136]
Channels 16 32 64
Input Type Current sinking logic
Module Cycle Time Cycle time of the user program
Rated Input Voltage 0...48/120 VAC 0...24 V
Input Voltage 0. . . 130 VAC -3...30 V
Maximum Input Current 5 mA 2.5 mA 2.9 A
Switching Point 31.6 VAC 9.3 V±10.4 V
Low Voltage Detection at 25 VAC 16 V 17 V
DO Module Parameter X-DI X-DI X-DI2 02 [137] 24 02 [138] 32 01 [139]
Channels 12 24 32
Galvanic Isolation Available
External supply voltage 24 VDC, -15. . . +20%
Output Voltage Supply voltage minus internal voltage drop
Voltage Drop 1.3 V at 2 A output current
Nominal Rated Current 2 A 0.5 A
Total Current Maximum: 12 A
Leakage Current Maximum: 500 µA
Overcurrent Interruption 2.5 A 0.75 A 0.8 A
S/C Limiting Current 6 A 2 A
Ohmic Load 2 A 0.5 A
Maximum Inductive Load 10 H 1 H 10 H
Maximum Capacitive Load 100 µF
Overload Protection 33 V 60 V 33 V
Channel Switching Time 200 µs 100 µs
Test Pulse 200 µs
Environmental Specifications
Protection IEC/EN 61131-2 Protection class III, IP20
Operating Temperature 0...+60◦C
Storage Temperature -40. . . +85◦C
Maximum Relative Humidity 95%
Pollution IEC/EN 60664-1 Pollution degree II
Altitude <2000 m
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Table B3: HIMax Counter Module Datasheet.
Parameter X-CI 24 01 [140]
Channels 24
Channel Pairs 12
Supply Voltage 24 VDC, -15%...+20%
Sensors Proximity switches
Count frequency 0...10 kHz for proximity switches,0...20 kHz for control circuit devices
Resolution 0.1 Hz
Counter Resolution 32-bit
Minimum Pulse Width 033.33 µs at 10 kHz16.66 µs at 20 kHz
Accuracy of Pulse Count ±1 pulse
Safety-related Accuracy ±1 % of final value
Protection IEC/EN 61131-2 Protection class III, IP20
Operating Temperature 0. . . +60 ◦C
Storage Temperature -40. . . +85 ◦C
Maximum Relative Humidity 95%
Pollution IEC/EN 60664-1 Pollution degree II
Altitude <2000 m
B.2 ControlSafe Platform (CSP)
Table B4: CSP Datasheet.
Parameter: Processor Details [54], [141], [142]
Type NXP QorIQ P2020, NXP QorIQ P1011.
Architecture e500
Instruction Set 32-bit
No. of Cores/Processor 2 (P2020), 1 (P1011).
No. of Threads/Core 1 (P2020), 1 (P1011).
Core Frequency 800-1300 MHz (P2020), 533-800 MHz (P1011).
Parameter: Memory Details [54], [141], [142]
L1 Data Cache 32 KB
L1 Instruction Cache 32 KB
L2 Cache/Core 512 KB (P2020), 256 KB (P1011).
L2 Cache ECC Support Available
L2 Cache Configurability As SRAM and stashing memory
Maximum Memory Size 1 GB/4 GB (P2020), 512 MB/2 GB (P1011).
Memory Type DDR3-800 SDRAM (P2020),DDR3-667 SDRAM (P1011).
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NOR Flash Memory 2x128 MB (P2020), 2x64 MB (P1011).
MRAM 2x2 MB (P2020), 1x2 MB (P1011).
Parameter: Redundancy [54], [55]
Voting Mechanism Dual Redundant 2oo2
Lockstep Mechanism Data Lockstep
Synchronization SRB and DCA.
Parameter: Expansion Option [141], [142]
No. of GbE Ports 3 (P2020), 3 (P1011).
No. of PCI Express Lanes 3 (P2020), 2 (P1011).
Serial RapidIO 2 (P2020)
USB 2.0 2 (P2020), 2 (P1011)
Memory Card SD/MMC
Other Interfaces SPI, 2xI2C, DUART.
Parameter: Fault Management [54]
Hardware-based: checks for latencies,
Software-based: checks diagnostics.
Parameter: DI Module [56]
Channels 8
Input Voltage 24 VDC
Parameter: DO Module [56]
Channels 8
Output Voltage 24 VDC
Power Consumption 8W
Parameter: Counter Module [56]
Channels 4
Limit Up to 10KHz
Parameter: Remote I/O [60]
Description Expansion Box Platform
Parameter: Railway Interfaces [54]
Description MVB, CAN, UART
Parameter: Communication [54], [59]
Ports 2 x RJ-45, 10/100/1000 BASE-T
Isolation Voltage 500 VAC
Topology Ring
Other Interfaces WLAN, GPS
Parameter: Power Supply [54]
Input Voltage 90-264VAC
Parameter: Safety Certification [62]
Compliant Standards
EN50126: 1999 (SIL4),
EN 50128: 2011 (SIL4),
EN50129: 2003 (SIL4),
IEC61508: 2010 (SIL3).
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Parameter: Life-cycle [54]
Planned Product Life 15 years
Support/Service 25 years
Hardware Availability 99.9999%
Parameter: Environmental Specifications [54]
Operating Temperature -40
◦C to +60 ◦C (open),
-40 ◦C to +70 ◦C (closed).
Cooling Forced air, Convection cooling
Vibration EN 61373 Category 1, Class B (EN 50155 12.2.11)
Shock EN 61373 Category 1, Class B (IEC 60068-2-27)
Chassis Sealing Standard: IP20, Optional: IP30.
Conformal Coating EN 50155 ST1 rating (Salt Mist Test)
Parameter: Other Standards [54]
Description EN50121, EN50124, EN50155,EN55024, EN60529, EN60571.
B.3 MH50C
Table B5: MH50C Datasheet.
Parameter: Processor Details [68], [143], [144]
Type Intel Atom E680T
Architecture Tunnel Creek (Queens Bay Platform)
Instruction Set 32-bit
No. of Cores/Processor 1
No. of Threads/Core 2
Core Frequency 1600 MHz
Parameter: Memory Details [68], [144]
L1 Data Cache 24 KB
L1 Instruction Cache 32 KB
L2 Cache/Core 512 KB
L2 Cache ECC Support Not available
L2 Cache Configurability As SRAM and stashing memory
Maximum Memory Size 2 GB
Memory Type DDR2 SDRAM
BIOS Flash Memory 2 MB
FRAM 8 KB
Mass Storage SSD mSATA 8GB
Parameter: Redundancy [71]
Voting Mechanism Dual Redundant 2oo2
Lockstep Mechanism Hard Lockstep
Synchronization SyncLayer
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Parameter: Expansion Option [68], [144]
No. of GbE Ports 4
No. of PCI Express Lanes 4
USB 2.0 6
Memory Card SD/MMC
Other Interfaces SPI, 2xI2C, DUART.
Parameter: Fault Management [68]
Software-based: checks for voltage, temperature
and internal errors of FPGA, CPUs, and clock.
Parameter: DI Module [72]
Channels 16
Input Voltage 24 V, 48 V, 72 V, 96 V, 110 V nom.
Input Current 1 mA to 10 mA, pulsed.
Supply Voltage 10.8 V to 13.2 V
Power Consumption Typical: 1.6 W, Maximum: 2.6 W.
Parameter: DO Module [73], [74]
Channels 8
Output Voltage 24 V, 48 V, 72 V, 96 V, 110 V nom.
Output Current Channel: 300mA, Total: 1200 mA.
Supply Voltage 10.8 V to 13.2 V
Power Consumption Typical: 1.6 W, Maximum: 2.5 W.
Parameter: Remote I/O Module [75]
Description KT4, KT8.
Parameter: Railway Interfaces [71]
Description MVB, CAN, Profinet.
Parameter: Communication [71], [145]
Ports 4 x M12, 100BASE-T
Isolation Voltage 1500 VAC
Topology Ring
Safe Communication FSoE
Other Interfaces WLAN, GPS.
Parameter: Power Supply [146]
Input Voltage 24 V, 36 V, 48 V, 72 V, 96 V, 110 VDC.
Input Power 14.4 VDC to 154 VDC
Input Current 35 A
Output Voltage 12.6 VDC, 5 VDC and 3.3 VDC.
Output Current 9.5 A, 24 A and 9.1 A
Parameter: Safety Certification [71]
Compliant Standards
EN50126: 1999, (SIL4)
EN 50128: 2011, (SIL4)
EN50129: 2003, (SIL4)
IEC61508: 2010 (SIL3).
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Parameter: Life-cycle [71]
Planned Product Life 10 years
Support/Service 25 years
Hardware Availability Unlimited in time
Parameter: Environmental Specifications [67]
Operating Temperature -40
◦C to +60 ◦C (open),
-40 ◦C to +85 ◦C (closed)
Cooling Forced air, Convection cooling
Vibration/Shock EN 50155: Rolling stock, vehicle body class B,EN 50125-3: Wayside, at least 3 m off the track
Chassis Sealing Standard: IP20
Altitude -300 m to +3000 m
Pollution Degree PD 2
Parameter: Other Standards [67]
Description EN50121, EN50124, EN50155,EN55024, EN60529, EN60571.
B.4 VxWorks 7
Table B6: VxWorks 7 technical specifications.
Parameter: OS Properties [82]
Architecture Microkernel
Inter Process Communication Shared memory
Scheduling Policy Priority-based pre-emptive, round-robin,adaptive scheduling.
Time and Space Partitioning Available
Memory Protection Yes
AMP/SMP/BMP Support Available
Processor Support 32-bit, 64-bit.
Board Support Arm, Power Architecture, Intel, RISC-V.
POSIX Compliance Yes
Virtualization Available
Backward Compatibility Available with VxWorks 6.x
Networking IPv4/IPv6, TSN: PTP IEEE 1588-2008,802.1AS-rev, 802.1Qbv, 802.1Qbu.
Connectivity IEEE 1394, Socket CAN,USB (host, target, and OTG), OPC-UA.
File System dosFS (FAT-compatible), HRFS with configur-able commit NAND and NOR flash support.
Multimedia Support OpenVG, OpenGL ES1/2, JPEG, PNG, PCMAudio, OpenCV.
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Security
Secure boot: digitally signed image.
Secure ELF loader: digi-signed applications.
Secure storage: encrypted disk and container.
Kernel hardening: non-executable pages, stack
guard pages, optional support for KPTI, code
and read-only data protection.
User management: security events, built-in
access controls, AD/LDAP support.
Arm Trustzone (OP-TEE support), TPM 2.0.
Network security protocols: SSL, SSH,
IPsec, IKE, GDOI, SCEP and Firewall.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3)
Parameter: Toolchain [85]
Name Workbench 3.3
Framework Eclipse 3.6, Eclipse CDT project 7.0
Languages C11, C++17, Python 3.8, Rust.
Compiler PowerPC: GCC, ARM and Intel: LLVM,Wind River DIAB Compiler.
Debugger Target debugging agent for VxWorks
Simulator VxWorks Simulator
Configuration Tools VxWorks Kernel Configurator
Run-Time Analysis Tools
System Viewer, Performance Profiler, Memory
Analyzer, Data Monitor, Code Coverage
Analyzer
Additional Tools
Wind River Workbench On-Chip Debugging
3.3, Wind River ICE 2, Wind River Probe,
IPL Cantata++ for Wind River Workbench.
Host OS Support
32- and 64-bit:Fedora 13, Novell SUSE Linux,
Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Ubuntu, Windows
7 32-bit: Windows XP Professional.
Target OS Support VxWorks: 5.x, 6.x, 7, Linux,Other OS: via IDE On-Chip Debugging.
Target Architecture ARM/Xscale, IA-32 and Intel 64, MIPS,PowerPC, Renesas SuperH, ColdFire.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3)
Parameter: BSP Support
CSP Available [147]
MH50C Available [148]
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B.5 QNX OS for Safety (QOS)
Table B7: QOS technical specifications.
Parameter: OS Properties [90], [91]
Architecture Microkernel
Inter Process Communication Message passing
Scheduling Policy Priority-based pre-emptive and other methods.
Time and Space Partitioning Available (adaptive)
Memory Protection Yes
AMP/SMP/BMP Support Available
Processor Support 32-bit, 64-bit
POSIX Compliance Yes
Virtualization Available
Backward Compatibility Available
Networking IPv4/IPv6
Connectivity
Wifi 802.11 a/b/g/n; USB 3.x, Host, Device,
and OTG support; Bluetooth v4.2 Classic
and Low Energy protocols and profiles.
File System DOS, HFS+, Image, RAM, Flash, QNX,Linux, CD-ROM, DVD, NFS, NTFS, CIFS.
Multimedia Support HTML5, Kanzi, OpenGL ES, Qt 5, Storyboard.
Security
Secure boot: Trust zone /TPM
Cryptography: AES 256
Self-verifying file systems, integrity
measurement, mandatory access control,
rootless execution, address space
layout randomization.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3)
Parameter: Toolchain [94]
Name QNX Momentics Tool Suite
Framework Eclipse
Languages C11, C++14, HTML5, QT, Python, Perl.
Compiler GCC
Debugger GDB
Run-Time Analysis Tools System Profiler, Valgrind Runtime ErrorDetection, Code Coverage, Target Monitoring.
Host OS Support Windows, Linux, macOS.
Target OS Support QNX legacy OS.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3)
Parameter: BSP Support
CSP Available [149]
MH50C Available [150]
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B.6 INTEGRITY
Table B8: INTEGRITY technical specifications.
Parameter: OS Properties [96]
Architecture Microkernel
Scheduling Policy Priority-based pre-emptive
Time and Space Partitioning Available, Enhanced Partition Scheduler
Memory Protection Yes
AMP/SMP/BMP Support Available, No BMP
Processor Support 32-bit, 64-bit.
Board Support PowerPC, Altera, AMD, ARM, NXP, FujitsuMarvell, Renesas, MIPS, Intel, TI, Xilinx.
POSIX Compliance Yes
Virtualization Available
Backward Compatibility Available
Networking IPv4/IPv6
Connectivity USB 1.1,2.0,3.0, Bluetooth, NFC.
File System DOS/FAT 12/16/32, ISO9660, Wear LevelingNOR/NAND, Flash File Systems, NFS.
Multimedia Support PEG, OpenGL.
Security
Secure boot,
Secure asset and intellectual property: digital
signing service, certificates
Secure data: unique device keys
Cryptography: TLS/SSL stack, FIPS 140-2
library, SSH stack, IPsec/IKE stack.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3),EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 3/4).
Parameter: Toolchain [99]
Name MULTI IDE 7
Framework Eclipse, Rhapsody, Emacs, vi.
Languages C, C++, EC++, Ada.
Compiler Green Hills Optimizing Compilers
Debugger TimeMachine Debugging Suite
Run-Time Analysis Tools PathAnalyzer, DoubleCheck, Memory Allocations,Run Time Error Checking, OSA Explorer, Profiler.
Host OS Support Windows, Linux.
Target OS Support INTEGRITY, Linux, VxWorks,Windows, OSE, ThreadX.
Target Architecture ARM, Tricore, Intel, MIPS,PowerPC, Renesas, ColdFire.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3),EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 3/4).
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Parameter: BSP Support [151]
CSP Legacy PowerPC: Available
MH50C Legacy Intel x86: Available
B.7 PikeOS
Table B9: PikeOS technical specifications.
Parameter: OS Properties [71], [103]
Architecture Microkernel
Scheduling Policy Priority-based pre-emptive
Time and Space Partitioning Available
Memory Protection Yes
AMP/SMP/BMP Support Available, No BMP
Processor Support 32-bit, 64-bit
Board Support PowerPC, x86, ARM, Renesas, Sparc V8/LEON.
POSIX Compliance Yes
Virtualization Available
Backward Compatibility Available
Networking IPv4/IPv6
Connectivity USB
File System NAND/NOR Flash, MMC Mass Storage.
Multimedia Support GPU drivers
Security Communication encryption, binary verification,MILS compliant.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3),EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 4).
Parameter: Toolchain [105]
Name CODEO
Framework Eclipse
Languages C, C++.
Compiler GCC
Debugger Graphical remote debugger
Simulator Simulation Targets
Run-Time Analysis Tools
static system analysis, remote system explorer,
PikeOS monitor, partition control, application
and kernel tracing.
Host OS Support 32-and 64-bit: Windows 7, 8, 10, Linux.
Target OS Support PikeOS, Linux, Android, ARINC 653,AUTOSAR, RTEMS, legacy RTOS.
Target Architecture ARM, PowerPC, x86, Sparc.
Safety Certifications IEC 61508 (SIL3), EN 50128 (SIL4).
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Parameter: BSP Support [152]
CSP Legacy PowerPC: Available
MH50C Legacy Intel x86: Available
B.8 SCADE
Table B10: SCADE technical specifications.
Parameter: IDE Properties [112]
Framework SCADE language (Model Based Programming)
Development Tools
SCADE Architect, SCADE LifeCycle, SCADE Test,
SCADE Display, Riming and Stack Optimizer,
Design Verifier, Configuration Management Tools
and Gateway, Python- and JAVA-based API, Library
for integrators, hysteresis,quantizers, filters.
Parameter: Code Generation [112]
Type C, Ada
Code Portability VxWorks 653, VxWorks CERT, INTEGRITY-178B,PikeOS, DDC-I Deos, Customizable RTOS Adaptors.
Compiler KCG
Debugger Proprietary
Safety Certification IEC 61508: 2101 (SIL 3), EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 3/4).
Certification Package Tool Qualification Plan, Tool OperationalRequirements, Tool Accomplishment Summary or
Safety Case, Compliance Analysis to standards.
Parameter: Host System [112]
Operating System Windows
RAM Minimum: 1 GB, Recommended: 2 GB.
Disk Space Minimum: 1 GB
Connectivity TCP/IP
B.9 FlexiSafe
Table B11: FlexiSafe technical specifications.
Parameter: IDE Properties [116]
Framework ISaGRAF
Languages IEC 61131-3, IEC 61499, C.
Development Tools
Cause and Effect Editor, Dependency Tree, Static
Checker, Version Source Control, Cross Reference
Browser, PLCopen Safety Function Blocks Library.
Parameter: Code Generation [116]
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Type C
Code Portability Any
Target Hardware 1oo1D, 1oo2D, 2oo2D, 2oo3.
Compiler Proprietary
Debugger Proprietary
Safety Certification IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3), EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 4).
Certification Package
Certification evidence of development environment
and procedures, test reports on TIC instructions,
relevant FlexiSafe and OS Safety manuals.
Parameter: Host System [116]
Operating System Windows
RAM 2 GB
Connectivity Ethernet, USB.
B.10 Prover Trident
Table B12: Prover Trident technical specifications.
Parameter: IDE Properties [121]
Framework Formal methods
Development Tools PiSPEC IP and Prover iLock suite
Parameter: Code Generation [121]
Type C and Ada.
Code Portability Any
Target Hardware Any
Compiler Prover iLock Coder
Debugger Prover iLock Simulator
Safety Certification EN 50128: 2011 (SIL 4)
Parameter: Host System [121]
Operating System Windows
B.11 CODESYS Safety
Table B13: CODESYS Safety technical specifications.
Parameter: IDE Properties [124]
Framework CODESYS Development System
Languages IEC 61131-3
Development Tools
CODESYS UML, Profiler, Test Manager, Static
Analysis, SVN, Application Composer, Safety
NetVars, PLCopen Safety Function Block Library,
Safety Fieldbus.
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Parameter: Code Generation [124]
Type C
Code Portability Windows and QNX.
Target Hardware TriCore, ARM, PowerPC.
Compiler Proprietary
Debugger Proprietary
Safety Certification IEC 61508: 2010 (SIL 3)
Certification Package
Safety integration and test manual: integration
interfaces with hardware abstract and adoptions; safety
verification package: framework for OEM tests;
CODESYS Test Manager: generation of automated
test cases, instruction and reports; approved safety
manual for users.
Parameter: Host System [124]
Operating System Windows
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C Annexes of Standards
C.1 IEC 61508: 2010
IEC 61508 – 2
Table C1: Annexes of Part 2 of IEC 61508: 2010.
Annex A
Demonstration of techniques for controlling failures during
operation for hardware components, such as CPU, I/O, power
supply, electromechanical devices, bus, clock, etc.
Annex B
Demonstration of techniques for avoiding systematic failures at
different life-cycle phases via project management, documentation,
separation between safe and non-safe functions, formal and semi-
formal methods, etc.
Annex C
Calculation of diagnostic coverage and safe failure fraction by
categorizing failure modes and performing Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis (FMEA).
Annex D Guidance for compiling safety manual containing functional speci-fications, failures modes, respective failure rates, constraints, etc.
Annex E
Illustration of requirements for Integrated Circuits (IC) with on-
chip redundancy focusing on avoiding failures, implementing watch-
dog and other monitoring elements, separate physical blocks, etc.
Annex F Requirement specifications for application-specific integrated circuits(ASIC) at the design, synthesis, testing, and manufacturing level.
IEC 61508 – 3
Table C2: Annexes of Part 3 of IEC 61508: 2010.
Annex A
Depiction of different techniques and measures for software develop-
ment to achieve a particular SIL in terms of, architectural design,
support tools and programming language, software module testing
and integration,hardware and software integration methods, software
validation and verification functional safety assessment, etc.
Annex B
Detailed tables from Annex A concerning design and coding stan-
dards, dynamic analysis and testing, functional and black-box
testing, failure analysis, modelling, performance testing, etc.
Annex C Guidance for choosing a set of techniques described in the Annexes.
Annex D Instructions on preparing a safety manual for software elements.
Annex E Representation of common software requirements described inIEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3.
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Annex F Description of isolation between different software elements in asingle computer system in terms of spatial/temporal independences.
Annex G
Guidance for life-cycles related with the system and application part
of the software for different variability programming and application
configurability profiles.
IEC 61508 – 5
Table C3: Annexes of Part 5 of IEC 61508: 2010.
Annex A Representation of individual and societal risks, different risk profiles,modes of operations, allocation of safety functions, etc.
Annex B
Overview of all the methods described in the following annexes and
criteria for adopting a method based on risk acceptance condition,
operating mode of safety functions, gravity of consequences, etc.
Annex C As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) method where the riskis reduced at a level to achieve a particular SIL.
Annex D A quantitative method used for quantifiable risks.
Annex E Risk graph methods, a qualitative method where SIL is calculatedfrom risk factors associated with the EUC.
Annex F Layer of protection analysis (LOPA).
Annex G Hazardous event severity matrix, a qualitative method used forunquantifiable risks.
IEC 61508 – 6
Table C4: Annexes of Part 6 of IEC 61508: 2010.
Annex A Overview of applications of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3.
Annex B Evaluation of probabilities of hardware failure via static and dyna-mic models, and Monte Carlo simulation techniques with examples.
Annex C Example calculation of diagnostic coverage and safe failure fraction.
Annex D Quantification of the effect of hardware-related common causefailures by using the β-factor and shock models.
Annex E
Description of software requirements for two use cases requiring SIL
2 and SIL 3 in terms of, safety requirements, architectural design,
support tools and programming languages, testing and integration,
verification, validation, and functional safety assessment.
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IEC 61508 – 7
Table C5: Annexes of Part 7 of IEC 61508: 2010.
Annex A
Control of random hardware failures concerning electromechanical
and electronic components, CPUs, variable and invariable memory
ranges, I/O, communication interfaces, mass-storage, power
supply, ventilation, environmental conditions, sensors, actuators, etc.
Annex B
Avoidance of systematic failures via project management, proper
documentation, isolating safety functions from non-safety functions,
usage of formal methods, finite state machines, time petri nets, etc.
and different testing methods, such as functional testing, black-box
testing, statistical testing etc., safety validation through static and
dynamic analyses, and failure analysis techniques.
Annex C
Achieving required software safety integrity by using structural
diagrammatic methods, such as Controlled Requirements Express-
ion (CORE), Jackson System Development (JSD), real-time Your-,
don etc.; implementing architectural design measures, e.g. fault
detection and diagnosis, error detecting/correcting codes, diverse
programming, applying proper development tools and languages,
certified compilers, verification methods, e.g. control and
data flow analyses, etc.
Annex D
Determining software safety integrity in pre-developed software,
auch as operating systems, libraries, compilers, etc. by statistical
methods for low and high demands of operation.
Annex E
Designing ASICs in very high speed integrated circuit hardware
description language (VHDL) or Verilog by following guidelines for
schematic entry, structured description, using tools, simulation,
functional testing, coding style, etc.
Annex F Definition of properties at different software life-cycle phases.
Annex G Guidance for safety-related object oriented software development.
C.2 EN 50126: 2017
EN 50126 – 1
Table C6: Annexes of Part 1 of EN 50126: 2017.
Annex A Guidance and an example illustrating methods and tools fordeveloping and managing a basic RAMS plan.
Annex B Display of different reliability, availability, maintenance and safetyparameters for a railway system.
Annex C Illustration on developing a risk matrix.
Annex D Description of functional definitions of a system.
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Table C7: Annexes of Part 2 of EN 50126: 2017.
Annex A
Description of methods, e.g. ALARP, Globalement Au Moins
Equivalent (GAME) and minimum endogenous mortality (MEM)
to define risk acceptance criteria.
Annex B Demonstration of calculating total hazard rate (THR) fromaccident and failure statistics.
Annex C Guidance on SIL allocation.
Annex D Illustration of qualitative and quantitative apportionment of systemto assign SIL.
Annex E Description of probabilistic mistakes which generates errors.
Annex F Description of different techniques, such as HAZOP, FMEA, ETA,FMECA, FTA, RBD, etc. for safety analysis.
Annex G
Definition of the roles and responsibilities of requirements manager,
designer, implementer, tester, verifier, integrator, validator,
assessor, project manager, and configuration manager.
C.3 EN 50128: 2011
Table C8: Annexes of EN 50128: 2011.
Annex A
Selection of techniques and measures to achieve required SIL for an
application, e.g. life-cycle issues, documentation, software require-
ments specification, software architecture, software design and
implementation, verification and testing, integration, overall software
testing, software analysis techniques, software quality assurance,
software maintenance, data preparation, coding standards, dynamic
analysis and testing, textual and diagrammatic programming
languages, modelling, performance testing, static analysis, code
coverage, object oriented software architecture and design, etc.
Annex B
Definition of the roles and responsibilities of requirements manager
designer, implementer, tester, verifier, integrator, validator,
assessor, project manager, and configuration manager.
Annex C Illustration of which of the previously mentioned actors in Annex Bwill write and check all the documents.
Annex D Bibliography of all the techniques mentioned in Annex A.
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Table C9: Annexes of EN 50128: 2011.
Techniques SIL 0 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4
Formal Methods - R R HR HR
Modelling R HR HR HR HR
Structured Methodology R HR HR HR HR
Modular Approach HR M M M M
Components HR HR HR HR HR
Design and Coding Standards HR HR HR M M
Analysable Programs HR HR HR HR HR
Strongly Typed Programming Language R HR HR HR HR
Structured Programming R HR HR HR HR
Programming Language R HR HR HR HR
Language Subset - - - HR HR
Object Oriented Programming R R R R R
Procedural Programming R HR HR HR HR
Metaprogramming R R R R R
Programming Languages
Table C10: Annexes of EN 50128: 2011.
Languages SIL 0 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4
ADA R HR HR HR HR
MODULA-2 R HR HR HR HR
PASCAL R HR HR HR HR
C/C++ R R R R R
PL/M R R R NR NR
BASIC R NR NR NR NR
Assembler R R R R R
C# R R R R R
JAVA R R R R R
Statement List R R R R R
Functional Block Diagrams R R R R R
Sequential Function Charts - HR HR HR HR
Ladder Diagram R R R R R
State Charts R HR HR HR HR
The requirements are categorized as per the following:
‘-’: no recommendation for or against being used.
‘NR’: Not Recommended for the particular safety integrity level.
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‘R’: Recommended for the particular safety integrity level.
‘HR’: Highly Recommended for the particular safety integrity level.
‘M’: Mandatory for the particular safety integrity level.
C.4 EN 50129: 2018
Table C11: Annexes of EN 50129: 2018.
Annex B Overview, detection, and effects of random hardware faults andsystematic faults, and methods applied against them.
Annex C
Overview of failure modes of different hardware components, such as
resistors, capacitors, electromagnetic components, diodes,
transistors, controlled rectifiers, surge suppressors, optoelectronic
components, filters, switches, buttons, fuses, lamps, batteries, etc.
Annex D Illustration of an example about how to define THR, TFFR and FRfor a safety-critical process and allocate SIL.
Annex E Overview of techniques and measures adopted to control andavoid systematic and random faults.
Annex F Guidance on using user-programmable integrated circuits (UPICs)within a safety architecture.
Annex G Overview of changes from the previous version, EN 50129:2003.
C.5 EN 50159: 2010
Table C12: Annexes of EN 50129: 2018.
Annex A
Overview on sources and consequences of threats, such as repetition,
deletion, insertion, delay, corruption, message masquerading, etc.,
and outline for compiling a safety case based on hazard analysis.
Annex B Overview of characteristics of different types of transmissionsystems and the threats associated with them.
Annex C
Discussions on possible threat-aversion mechanisms, such as use of
time stamps, safety codes, e.g. main, linear, cyclic, hash and
cryptographic block codes, use of digital signatures, etc.
Annex D Use cases on using the standard.
Annex E Mapping of parts with the previous version, EN 50159: 2001.
